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ABSTRACT 
The power system is a widespread and complex network whose complete behavior, at present, still remains 
partially characterized. Power systems have operated in most cases reliably, but conservatively with the help of 
many deterministic techniques that rely heavily on the modeling of system components and the associated 
dynamics. Now, with mcreasing competition and growing demand, the power system, however, has been 
shifting from a deterministically regulated system to a competitive and uncertain market environment Power 
utilities are required to have a com(»ehensive knowledge of the risks as well as benefits in their transmission 
operations. Our interest is motivated by this need of the industry to provide a method to quantify the risk of 
operating a power system with consideration to the probabilistic nature of system behaviors. The objective of 
this dissertation is to develop a foundation of risk-based bulk power system security assessment that leads to the 
definition, calculation, and application of the "risk" in operating electric power systems. The work includes 
three parts of risk assessments: transmission line thermal overload, voltage insecurity and composite risk 
assessments. Both the probability of insecurity problems and their cost consequences are measured such that an 
expected monetary impact is given as the measurement of risk. This quantitative measurement of thermal, 
voltage, and composite risk is helpful for the operator to trade off the benefits and costs in the competitive 
utility environment For making this economic tradeoff, several decision criteria, including both deterministic 
and probabilistic strategies, from conservative to greedy preference, are introduced to aid the operator to make 
operating decisions. This research establishes a bridge between power system seciuity and economics by the 
index of risk that is compatible with the economic results of market-based electricity trading. Both the method 
to quantify the risk and the ways to apply it in decision-making make contributions to the power industry. 
1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The power system is a widespread and complex netwoik whose complete behavior, at present, still remains 
partially characterized. Since the massive blackout of New York City and most of the Northeast m 1965, power 
systems have operated in most cases reliably, but conservatively with the help of many deterministic techniques 
that rely heavily on the modeling of system components and the associated cfynamics. These approaches include 
methods for both steady state and dynamic analysis. The analyses are conducted to obtain system operating 
limits which satisfy reliability critoia established by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC). 
Now, with increasing competition and growing demand, power utilities are required to have a comprehensive 
knowledge of the risks as weU as benefits in their transmission operations. 
Within the electric network, an individual disturbance with non-zero cost consequence may occur for a 
number of reasons at any time m any system environment The disturbance m^ result in overload, voltage 
collapse, or transient instability, and draw the i»evailing system to an uncontrollable cascading situation lesuling 
to widespread power outages. To maintain system reliability under these uncertainties, certain limits are 
required in operating the power system. The current approach in the industry uses deterministic methods to 
calculate these limits with significant safety margins to cover "all" the possible unknown uncertainties. In 
practice, this means that power engmeers propose a strong system and then operate it with large security 
margins. Thou^ investment and operational costs are relatively high, this has resulted in a high degree of 
reliabUity in most power systems. 
The power system, however, has been shifting from a deterministically regulated system to a competitive 
and uncertain market environment A fluctuation of market demand and supply has led to an uncertain market 
price in the system operation. Although some methods of risk assessment as well as risk management have been 
introduced into the market-oriented energy trading business, the traditional deterministic reliability criteria are 
still intact This has led engineers to ^e more pressure, from economic imperatives in the marketplace, to 
operate power systems with lower security margins. In order to be able to operate the system closer to the 
traditional deterministic limits, or even beyond them, more refined methods for power system security 
assessment are needed that take into account the probabilistic nature of many uncertain variables in the 
decision-making environment Also, from the perspective of long-term operating economics, a quantitative 
assessment of risk allows us to make decisions that minimize the total cost, cost of security violation and cost of 
energy supply, over the long run to attain economic efficiency. 
Our interest is motivated by this need of the industry to provide a method to quantify the risk of operating 
a power system with consideration of the probabilistic nature of system behavior. The objective of this 
dissertation is to develop a foundation of risk-based bulk power system security assessment that leads to the 
definition, calculation, and applicaticm of die "risk" in operating electric power systems. 
2 
1.2 Human Ancestor's Philosophy of "Avoiding Rislc'' 
Take a glimpse at the history of the human race. "The entire history of human species is a chronology of 
exposure to misfortune and adversi^ and of efforts to deal with risk"[l]. Great dangers in unknown lands, 
including dreaded beasts, &tal diseases, tidal waves, and a fear of falling over the edge of an imaginary world 
are testimony to the enormous risk that humans have fiu%d in their exploration of this world. "Many of our 
primitive ancestor's respinses to risk were identical to those of other animals. Without a great deal of thought, 
people who were threatened by dangerous beasts fled" [1]. As a result they were able to avoid dangerous areas 
and situations (see Figure I.) 
1.3 Power System Security 
In the course of conquering this world, together with the risks in the natural world, human beings also face 
numerous risks created through their man-made wonders. One of the wonders, electrical power system, has 
contributed to the many advances and conveniences in modem human life. The heavy dependency on electrical 
power systems was fully demonstrated by the blackout of New York City in 1965 and the second major 
blackout, the PJM blackout of 1967 which caused power to be interrupted in all or portions of four states [2], 
The fear of a similar massive outage in the country led the power industry to invest greater effort to increase 
understanding of electrical power system behavior and to place operations on a secure basis to prevent future 
problems. This effort produced a reliable, if conservative technique of maintaining system security. "N-1" 
security, as it often termed, examines the behavior of an N-component system that has lost any one major 
component 
Figure 1: Philosophy of Avoiding Risk 
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1-3.1 The Terms 
The North American Electric Reliability CouncQ (NERQ uses reliability [3] in a bulk electric system to 
indicate "the degree to which the performance of the elements of that system results in electricity being 
delivered to customers within accepted standards and in the amount desired. The degree of reliability may be 
measured by the frequency, duration, and magnitude of adverse effects on the electric supply." The MERC also 
suggests that reliability can be addressed by considering two basic and fimctlonal aspects of the bulk electric 
system - adequacy and security. In this research, the discussion is limited to the security aspect of power 
s3rstem reliability, which is defined in [3] as "the system's capacity to withstand disturbances arising firom faults 
and the unscheduled removal of bulk power supply equipment without the further loss of facilities or 
cascading." Given adequate capability to supply the energy demand, a system is secure, if its components are 
not stressed beyond their ratings, and bus voltages and system frequency remain within tolerance when any 
single credible contingency occurs. Unlike the long-term planning where the system conditions are unknown, 
security analysis measures the system's reliability in the near future, given an operating condition. 
1.3.2 The Problems 
Security problems most commonly manifest themselves in three different forms. Thermal overload of a 
c ircuit occurs when current exceeds the rating of a circuit, and the circuit overheats due to the I^R losses, 
resulting in circuit loss of life and subsequent consequences. This is the most universal seciuity problem in the 
transmission systems. Voltage collapse typically occurs in power systems which are heavily loaded, friulted or 
have reactive power shortages. It is associated with the reactive power of loads not being met because of 
limitations on the production and transmission of reactive power, and it may result in system-wide loss of loads 
and blackout. The third form, rotor angle instability, is concerned with the system dynamic response following 
a large disturbance in terms of the generators' capability to remain in synchronism. The risk of thermal overload 
and voltage collapse is the primary topics of interest in this research.' 
1.3.3 The Methods 
There are two approaches for reliability assessment; the probabilistic method, which assesses the reliability 
level of a system and which has largely been used in adequacy assessment, and the deterministic approach, 
which is predominantly used in both security and adequacy assessment 
As described by the Conference Internationale Des Grande Reseaux Electriques (CIGRE) in its latest 
position report [S], the security assessment in practice works as follows: 
' We have partially addressed the transient instability problem already in [4]. 
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1.3.3.1 Identification of Credible Contingency Set 
In Older to perform security assessment, the normal practice for a utility is to first identify a set of credible 
omtingencies based on a combination of history, experience; obvious relations, worst-case analysis, trial and 
error, and even hunches of experienced planners, operators, and engmeers. In practice, they are usually defined 
as the loss of any single critical element (Le., line, transformer, generatmg unit, etc.) m a power system either 
spontaneously or preceded by a single-phase f^t Several hundred to a couple of thousand critical component-
contingencies are identified for a typical transmission grid. This is usually referred to as the N-1 criterion. 
1.3.3.2 Detemiination of Security Limits 
According to the N-1 criterion, the utility plans and operates the power system such that, if any one of the 
above mentioned credible contingencies occurs, the system will 
1. rapidly recover through the use of regular protection systems and automatic control devices, and continue 
to supply all die load within emergency (voltage and firequency) ratings, and 
2. re-enter an adequate state, at most, by means of minor system adjustments, including manual switching. 
After obtaining a deterministic boundary by the contingency analysis, a safety margin that works as a 
buffer for other unknown uncertainties is added to discount the security boundary. All we have done is to make 
the system siu^ve under any possible, credible contingency. The security limits, therefore, constitute the first 
line of defense of a power system in an essentially "passive" strategy against the many unforeseen events that 
can perturb or threaten its operation. 
1.3.3.3 Security Criteria 
The above mentioned approach to dealing with power system security is fiilly deterministic. The 
philosophy behind this approach is similar to our human ancestors fleeing fi^m dangerous lands. If they thought 
there was one beast in the jungle, they would keep themselves away fi'om its living area. If there were two or 
more, they would avoid the entire area occupied by any of these beasts. 
Similarly, the deterministic criterion, without any probabilistic analysis of whether one could meet a beast 
and the possibility of being attacked by a beast, simply provides large margins in protecting the system against 
severe contingencies. In practice, this means that power engineers can propose a strong system and operate it 
with large security margins. Though investment and operational costs are relatively high, this has resulted in a 
high degree of reliability in most power systems. 
"Some human-like creatures, such as Homo erectus and Homo Sapiens neanderthalensis reacted to threats 
in these ways but, despite the &ct that they were larger and stronger, failed in their efforts to manage the threats 
to their existence" [1]. 
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f .4 The Gaps 
In contrast, "anatomically modem bmnans {Homo Sapiens Sapiem) not only survived but flourished. 
Human's continued existence becomes a testimony to the success of our ancestors in managing risk. The 
difference [between modem humans and other creatures] was the unique human gift of reason. Men and women 
think, and it is in their abiliQr to tfiink that they deal with risks in ways that are different from those of other 
creatures... by their ability to anticipate adversity and to prepare for it" [1]. From this sense of evolution, there is 
a necessity to improve the existing deterministic approach to securiQ' assessment. 
In the recent changes in regulatory policies towards inter-udlity power interchange practices, a major focus 
of the changing policies is "competition" as a replacement for "regulation" to achieve economic efficiency. A 
number of changes would be required from operating, planning, and organizational standpomts. 
From an operational point of view, transmission corridors are substantial power market mfluences, i.e., the 
choice of one limit over another for a transmission corridor can translate into millions of dollars per year for the 
selling and buying entities. Energy marketers need as much transfer capability as possible to deliver their 
ener^ from one place to another for making profits. To maintain system reliability, however, a certain amount 
of transfer limit has to be maintained regardless of the economic forces behind the marketers. 
The blame has been expressed by some engineers that the maiketer, who is driven by monetary profits to 
use economic risk management, is pushing the engineer to continually reduce the current safety margin and to 
operate systems closer and closer to the deterministic security limits. Today's universal deterministic approach 
to security assessment, however, presents remarkable gaps between the industry trend and the results it 
provides. This becomes apparent in the following situations: 
• The present deterministic approach to secinity assessment results in costly operating restrictions. 
• The granted security limits, which are mandatory for all the operating decisions, are not justified in their 
supposed low level of risk. 
• The current approach, which does not take into account the probabilistic nature of uncertainties, maintains 
the security by simply restricting the activities within its conservative margins, leaving the world beyond its 
boundary uncharted. 
• Finally, the incentive for one to explore or chart the world outside does not exist simply because the rule 
has been set. That is partially why some engineers feel anxious when marketers aggressively push them to 
operate beyond traditional limits, because these areas have never been very well explored before. 
These gaps motivate us to propose an alternative risk-based security assessment to quantify the risk of 
system operation and to directly connect power system economics and security to benefit both profit-driven 
marketers and reliability-driven engineers. 
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1.5 The Objective 
The research objective of this dissertation is to develop the foundation for risk-based security assessment of 
electric power systems. The concept of risk in power system operation will be mtroduced. The research will 
develop methods of measuring risk in tenns of thennal overload, voltage collapse, and hence provide a 
composite security index for determining system security leveL This work will also propose several decision­
making guidelines for operating systems based on the risk under various situations. 
1.6 Our Method 
The method we propose in this dissertation is a probabilistic method that takes into account the 
probabilistic nature of a power system's operating uncertainties. The risk calculated is an expected monetary 
impact or cost consequence over a short period of time under a given operating condition. Within the scope of 
security assessment, we use a "forecasted" probability distribution of the uncertainties, such as contingencies 
and weather under the known information of the current operating condition, multiplied by their associated cost 
consequences. That is. 
Equation 1: Generic Risk Expression 
RisKX,) = 
= J/Pr(E,. I 
where the risk of a current pre-contingency operating condition X, is given by the expected value of the future 
monetary impact E{fsa{X,^^) | A*,). It is a double integral of the product of probability of uncertainties^ and the 
corresponding (post-contingency) impact, along the uncertain event £, and uncertain fiiture operating condition 
• 
The risk calculated has explicit economic meaning and represents the expected cost due to possible 
insecurity problems. It measures the economic consequence of an uncertainty weighted by its probability of 
occurrence. This significant property makes risk a direct bridge between the power system economics and 
security such that the security can be treated in the same way as an ordinary commodity. The security can no 
longer be a mandatoty constraint to ordinary decision-making problems; rather it becomes in itself a decision­
making problem, which leads the power industry closer to the ideal of a free market 
From the perspective of risk itself, the following advantages occur 
• Our method is able to quantify the risk of insecurity, which itself has die nature of uncertainty. 
^ The uncertain event set (£,, V i = 0, includes the possibility that the current state remains the same and no 
other event occurs. 
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• The quantified risk provides an economic consequence of msecurity by taking account of both the 
probability and severity of uncertam events. 
• Managing security becomes a decision problem dependmg on the preference of the decision-maker to the 
exposure to the risk, rather than putting mandatory limits by rule. 
• The resultant risk charts the system both within the traditional boundary and the world outside by 
augmenting the traditional deterministic security limits with die inclusion of risk in the assessment 
• The risk is able to fimction as a lever to adjust the behavior of market participants via economic 
mechanisms to avoid system security problems rather than the mandatory cutting of transactions by mie. 
A detailed method describing the procedure to calculate the individual risks for each security problem, and 
ultimately arriving at a composite risk index is discussed in Chapter 3,4, and S. At this point, it is worthwhUe to 
cite a comparison of both deterministic and probabilistic approaches used in our industry by the latest position 
report [S] on power system security assessment. 
1.7 Deterministic Method versus Probabilistic Method 
The weakness of the deterministic approach lies primarily in the arbitrariness of selecting contingencies for 
the N-1 tests, and of choosing specific values for parameters in studies, which hides the underlying probabilistic 
nature of many variables. It may lead to ignoring important cases and including unlikely ones. The fear of 
omitting critical cases usually results in a conservative over-design without any indication that risks are reduced 
to an acceptable level. 
The probabilistic approach, on the other hand, reduces the above mentioned weakness but has been 
relatively slow in being accepted as a methodology that can be used in practice. One fector that accounts for this 
is the accuracy of the probabilistic models employed and the precision of the solution methods that are derived. 
These problems are also present in the deterministic approach, but due to the greater simplicity and 
transparency of this method, the simplifications and approximations applied are often perceived to be justified. 
As a consequence, the deterministic approach often un&irly enjoys higher credibility. Another factor is the 
unavailability of standards for what constitutes acceptable risk. 
The author of this dissertation also thinks one reason for the difficulty of probabilistic approaches may be 
partially due to the primary philosophy of engineering as a discipline whose objective is to make the world 
more well-defined and precise. Consequently, most engineers are more comfortable accepting a clear 
deterministic number instead of an uncertain value carrying some amount of variance. However, this world is a 
world full of uncertainties. Our technology is developed to reduce diese uncertainties but never elimmate them. 
To characterize the existing uncertainties will aid engineers to find better ways to reduce them. 
s 
2 REVIEW OF RELATED WORK 
2.1 Pmbabilistic Approaches in Power System Security Assessment 
While the detenninistic approaches in power system security assessment have become an accepted practice 
in the industry, an extensive amount of work has also taken place in the area of probabilistic approaches, 
specifically using probabilistic methods for adequacy assessment in generating reserve capaciQr evaluations. 
Most of them can be found in the bibliographic papers [6] and [7]. The sophisticated nature of the security 
problem, however, has led to relatively, conservative use of probability methods for security assessment From 
[S] we note. The probabilistic nature of power system security (both dynamic and static) has been well 
recognized since early days of modem power system operation and control. However, probabilistic security 
assessment has not been much developed. Even if some practical methods have been elaborated, none has been 
able to impose itself and, as we have seen, in todi^r's everyday practice the problem is still essentially 
approached deterministically." On the other hand some attention to the probabilistic methods for the evaluation 
of system security can be found in [8], [9], [10], and [11]. Reference [8] provides a framework integrating both 
adequacy and security evaluation. An expected load actually interrupted (ELAI) is calculated as the measure of 
reliability. The author of [8] states that "the development of Security Limits is very important. Clearly, these 
limits are an input to the reliability evaluation problem as the essence of reliability analysis is the separation of 
states into success and feilive states, and the Security Limits, as well as equipment rating limits, from 
fundamental criteria for such separation." Reference [9] gives a probabilistic security cost which is similar to 
the concept of risk. Reference [10] calculates a probability of system remaming secure with consideration of 
differential equations. The framework of [11] provides a random time for the system shifting frvm a secure 
region to an insecure one. Although different measurements and methods are developed, die same "separation" 
idea, such as "Security Limits" in [8], "Operational Limit Boundary (OLB)" in [9], "Dynamic Security Region" 
in [10], and "Security Region" in [11], can be found in a variety of probabilistic security assessment techniques. 
One of the distinctions of the risk-based security assessment in this dissertation is that the ratings and security 
limits are no longer deterministic. 
This work focuses on the risk-based electric power systems' security assessment There are many 
publications relating to the topics of risk, probability, statistics, and power system security. The references listed 
are by no means comprehensive. Our focus in this research endeavor is to review probabilistic techniques that 
are closely related to die nature of the work we are perfotming, specifically the security problems of thermal 
overload and voltage collapse and their corresponding impact on the victims. 
2.2 Theoretical Foundations 
The transition from a fixed rate of return industry to a participant in a competitive energy market means 
that the power industry has shifted from its original deterministic, reliability-oriented operation to a profit-
9 
oriented situation. Consequently, the concept of risk, so much a part of the field of economics and finance has to 
be introduced into the ^stem operation. This is becoming more cracial under the situation of a competitive 
environment that may bring numerous uncertainties and unknown Actors to the originally relatively reliable 
system operation. 
The concept of risk is a well-developed one and has been applied in areas of business, finance, managerial 
economy, and insurance m the modem busmess environment Other industries, such as nuclear power, space 
systems, chemical process, etc. also develop their risk management due to the characteristics of high hazardous 
consequences. References [I], [12], and [13] reveal the scope of the ways in which financial risk is managed, in 
contrast to the typical engmeering risk that engineers &ce. Reference [14] documents a Symposium for the 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Management in nuclear power, airline safety, chemical process and 
other mdustries. Although the termmology of risk m different area varies, the risk assessment is basically asking 
three questions [14]: 
1. What can go wrong? 
2. How likely is that to happen? 
3. If it does happen, what are the consequences? 
To integrate all of these three questions in our risk assessment, theories on both probabUity and power 
systems are needed. References [IS], [16], and [17] deal with the theory of probability, statistics, and applied 
statistical methods. Reference [18] discusses the probability concept used in electric power systems, and [19] 
and [20] give the models, static and dynamic analysis, and operations and control of modem electric power 
systems. The risk-based security assessment in this work originates from [4] and [21], which provide both the 
concept and the method of determining the risk in power system stability analysis. 
2.3 Topics on Thermal Overload and Voltage Stability 
Regarding theory of conductor thermal overload and voltage stability, references [22], [23], and [24] have 
extensive discussions on diese two topics, including basic concepts, mechanisms, models, and analytic methods. 
Particular topics of transmission line thermal overload and its potential impacts can be found [25] through [48]. 
A bibliographical publication of voltage stability can be found in [SO]. The closely related publications on 
voltage stability as well as the voltage impact are listed in [51] through [77], where the probabilistic methods 
and research on maximum load margin in voltage assessment are specially emphasized. The detailed reviews of 
both overload and voltage stability topics are given in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 
2.4 Topics on Decision-Making 
Although the major part of this dissertation is the risk assessment for power system security, a review of 
some of the literature on the decision-making under uncertainQr and applications in power systems is also 
provided. Basic strategies in [86] and applications in [87] and [88] are introduced in Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation. 
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> Differences between the Proposed and Related Work 
The proposed work differs fiom die previous ones in die following respects: 
An obvious distinction is made between the proposed probabilistic approach and the traditional 
deterministic security assessment, within the theoretical foundations of electric power systems. 
A risk-based security assessment framework is provided. Existing literature discusses only cost-based 
reliability assessment focusing on the aspect of adequacy without considering performance impact 
Both probability and impact evaluation is incorporated into the risk assessment Few existing probabilistic 
assessment approaches, which compute the probability of insecurity, consider quantification of 
consequence or fiuther monetary cost of these uncertainties. 
The uncertainties existing in the impact as well as system contingencies and other fluctuations are taken 
into account in the risk-based security assessment In this way, the limits, such as on branch flows and on 
bus vohages are no longer treated as mandatory values as in the existing deterministic and probabilistic 
approaches to security assessment 
A bridge between power system security and economics is established by the index of risk. The concept of 
risk that underlies this work provides an economic measurement of system security which is compatible 
with the economic results of market-based electricity trading. This is a significant difference from other 
security indices. 
11 
3 TRANSMISSION LINE OVERLOAD RISK ASSESSMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Problem Statement 
Every conductor used in power system trananission circuits has associated ampacities or current limits, 
called thermal capacities or thermal ratings. An elevation of the conductor temperature due to flow of more 
current may bring about both mechanical and electrical damages on the transmission line. Consequently, the 
line's thermal ratings are limited by the conductor's Maximum Design Temperature (MDT). 
Normally, power engineers deterministically calculate the thermal ratings of transmission lines by applying 
the maximum designed temperature and other assumed specific values of input data, such as ambient 
temperature and wind speed, into the thermal balance equation according to the law of Joule heating ([25], 
[26]). The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has published a standard [25] to describe 
how to calculate these deterministic thermal ratings. 
It has long been realized that these ratings are conservative and result in under-utilization of conductors. 
Besides the firm, conservative and non-uniform current limits, there is neither a measurement nor a motivation 
provided to assist operators in making more informed decisions. 
3.1.2 Previous Work 
Past research in this area has been generally devoted to increasing conductor ratings to overcome the under-
utilization of existing lines. Three techniques have been applied to overcome this drawback: 
• Short-Time and Long-Time Emergency Ratings [27], [28], [29], 
• Dynamic Thermal Ratings [27], [28], [30], [31], and 
• ProbabUistic Methods [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], 
3.1.2.1 Short- and Long-Time Emergency Ratings 
It is generally believed that conductors can sustain over-the-limit operation conditions for a short period of 
time without significant damage or impact. For example, D.G. Pavin uses higher maximum temperatures to 
determine temporary overload limits for a 15 minute or 4 hour emergency period [29]. Based on these higher 
allowable temperatures, one can calculate the higher Short and Long Time Emergency Ratings (STE, LTE) 
using the same method as provided by die IEEE standard [25]. A similar method can be found in [39]. 
3.1.2.2 Dynamic Thermal Ratings 
Dynamic Thermal Ratings (DTR) are computed fiom real time meteorological measurements rather than 
fixed values. They vary as a function of time, depending on variation in ambient conditions. By installing 
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additional sensors to monitor either ambient data or the conductor heatmg conditions, this technique releases the 
ratings fiom the highly omservative weather assumption of the deterministic method. However, a significant 
problem with a dynamic line-rating G>TR) system is equipment cost [38]. Another disadvantage of DTR is that 
it acts well only as a thermal "monitor." In other words, it prevents the or current thermal damages. DTR, 
however, cannot prevent fiiture damages. To provide future ratings for the scheduled system condition, it still 
needs similar conservative assumptions as made by all the deterministic methods to avoid damage in the future. 
3.1.2.3 Probabilistic Method 
Ambient weather conditions are the major determinants of conducts temperature under a given line flow. 
Uncertain variables of air temperature, wind speed, solar radiation, and other &ctors affect the temperature of a 
conductor. Typically, a designer uses conservative assumptions, for example, 40" C air temperature and 2 ft/s 
wind speed, to guarantee the extremely low probability of the actual temperature exceeding its limit. This 
results in a secure but &irfy conservative line thermal rating. 
Due to the uncertain nature of transmission line overload, there is also a growing mterest in using 
probabilistic methods [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], which account for the variability and stochastic nature of 
the ambient conditions, without requiring real time meteorological measurements. The probabilistic method 
calculates the probability that the conductor temperature exceeds its maximum designed temperature under a 
given current level, such that line ratings can be decided by a permissible overload probability. 
3.1.3 Our Approach 
In this dissertation, we develop a new method that combines probability and impact calculation to provide 
the risk of transmission line overload. The risk, which indicates the expectation of the cost consequence 
associated with thermal overload, may be effectively used to make decisions regarding the line loading and 
system operation. The assessment, hence, consists of two issues: probability evaluation and impact evaluation. 
The "component" assessment, which is the thermal risk of a single transmission line under a given line current, 
and the "system" assessment, which is the thermal risk of a desired control region under a given operating 
condition, are also discussed and illustrated in the following sections. 
3.2 Method Overview 
The objective of the approach presented is to assess the risk associated with the transmission line overload^ 
given an operating condition. There are two tiers of assessment: "component" assessment and "system" 
assessment. The purpose of the component assessment is to evaluate the thermal risk of a single transmission 
^ We want to clarify the term "overload" here; it is not simply that the line flow goes beyond a magic number. 
Radier, it is that the line temperature exceeds its maximum design temperature. The reason is that a given over-
limit line flow does not necessarily resuh in a harmful thermal overload when the ambient condition is not 
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line with a given line flow. The purpose of tfie system assessment is based on both the probability distribution 
of line flow under a system-wide environment and the result of component assessment, to calculate the regional 
or system-«dde thermal risk associated with an operating condition. 
3.2.1 Component Thermal Risk Assessment [37] 
The component thermal risk is the expected impact of thermal overload on a transmission line given a 
specified current flowing through the line. An Ulustrative diagram in Figure 2 shows the general components 
and method to compute the risk. 
PI^ of Condactor Ten^eratore 
Condncror Twmpftratnrft 
Impact 1 r | ProbabHixy 
I Detamioms RatiDss 
Sas-TcmpezatuM Model 
Fitdogs andothcx Impacts Sa; Impact CalculatKKi 
Tbomal RiskCalculatioa 
Aooealins Impact Calculatioa 
Stzcntth-TempaatuDcc Model 
PxobabilTitK Ambient CoDditioa 
CoDductDz Thomal Model 
Figure 2: Diagram of Component Thermal Risk 
The risk is calculated as the expected value of thermal impact including loss of conductor life due to 
annealing and loss of line clearance due to sag. These two types of impact are all determined by the conductor 
temperature that is the result of line flow and ambient conditions. Based on the probabilistic presentation of 
ambient conditions, the probability fimction of conductor temperature can be obtained and then multiplied with 
its impact to compute the expected impact value, i.e., the risk. 
known. The impact(s) associated with the thermal problem is, therefore, uncertain and depends on the uncertain 
ambient environment. 
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3.2.2 System Thermal Risk Assessment 
Component thermal risk assessment provides us the detailed, mdividual-dependent thermal risk stucfy of 
each transmission line. It also provides a line's thermal risk-cinrent curve under different cmrent levels.^ 
When pursuing system assessment, the Ime flow on each transmission line is determined by the system 
operating condition. Different lines, therefore, have different loading levels, ambient environment and 
capabilities to sustain the thermal burdens, and result in various levels of risk. The system thermal risk 
assessment is to obtain the regional or system-wide aggregate thermal risk based on the distribution of line 
flows and ambient conditions. It is computed as the sun of each individual line's thermal risk where each 
individual risk is obtained by calculating the expected value of hnpact based on the distribution of line current 
and the component risk-current curves. Figure 3 is an illustrative diagram for the system thermal risk 
assessment 
System Operatiag Condidon 
Line Flows 
flow 
System Risk 
Power Flow Sohnion Component Risk Assessment 
Figure 3: Diagram of System Analysis 
3.3 Analytical Development 
In this section, we concentrate on the analytic details of the risk assessment of transmission line thermal 
overload. We first develop the risk assessment for a single conductor and then describe the entire details of risk 
assessment for an operating condition. 
* For die short time overload, this risk curve depends on both current level and the duration time. We can define 
the time frame we are interested in studying. One-hour basis study is generally assumed in this report for the 
security assessment except particularly mentioned and the chapter for planning 
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3.3.1 Conductor Heating Model 
Electrical current flowing tbrough a conductor experiences resistance and dissipates part of die energy into 
the conductor. This loss of eneigy associated with the current flow is shown as the heat gain of the conductor 
due to resistance. Besides gainmg heat dirough resistance, it is assumed that exposure to the sun is associated 
with solar radiation gain. 
A bare overhead conductor is also exposed to its surrounding ambient circumstance. Heat gain resulting 
from electric current in a conductor and solar radiation is dissipated in the form of heat to the surrounding 
atmosphere. This heat dissipation can take any of three forms: conduction, convection, and radiation. Owing to 
the minimal contact of the conductor with the suspension insulators at each support tower, losses due to heat 
conduction are negligible m comparison with losses due to ccmvection and radiation. 
These losses are primarily driven by the temperature difference between the conductor and its ambient 
surroundings, while they are significantly enhanced by the cooling effects of wind in the form of convection. A 
chart of heat flow is shown in Figure 4. 
RafiarioaLesf 
Figure 4: Conductor Heat Flow 
3.3.1.1 Steady State Heat Balance Equation 
The steady state conductor temperature is determined from the thermal balance between the heat gain and 
losses in the conductor. This behavior, in ANSI/IEEE Standard [25], is expressed by the heat balance equation, 
given in Equation 2. Other thermal models, which include more ambient factors, can be found in [22]. What is 
needed here is an effective thermal model to compute the conductor temperature under given line flow and 
various ambient conditions. As shown in Figure 2, the IEEE model used can be substituted for other models 
depending on the user's preference. 
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Equation 2: Steady State Heating Model 
I^Rm + Qs =0r(^.^a)+ec(^.«a.A) 
Here, I^R, are the Joule (resistance) and solar heat gain, respectively, and are the heat loss by 
radiation and convection, 0, 0„ and fi are conductor temperature, air temperature and wind velocity, 
respectively. 
At this equilibrium point, the dissipation of heat due to conductor radiation and air convection is equal to 
the total heat gain of the conductor. The conductor temperature remains at this steady state temperature unless 
its heat balance is disturbed. 
In the following sections, we discuss each heat gain and heat loss term in detail. 
3.3.1.2 Convected Heat Loss 
The formula of convected heat loss is classified mto forced convected heat loss and natural convection heat 
loss by the EEEE standard [25] because the convection is significandy different depending on whether the 
conductor is exposed to strong wind or a still atmosphere. 
• Forced Convected Heat Loss 
The convected heat loss is the largest value of and Q^2, ^ is the conductor diameter in inches. 
= 1.01+037 (^ r 
= max(Q^i,Qc2) 
Pj  is the density of air in Ib j f t ^  , fX j  is absolute viscosity of air in Ib / ih rX f t ) ,  and k j  is thermal 
conductivity of air in . 
• Natural Convection Heat Loss at Sea Level 
With the Mnnd speed being zero, the natural convection heat loss at sea level is expressed as. 
= O.O72£>°"((9-0„)'^  
• Natural Convection Heat Loss at Altitudes Above Sea Level 
= 0.283p°^D°"(^-^„y^ 
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The data of air density , an-viscosity //y^, and the coefficient of air dtermal conductivity kj against 
different altitudes are listed in the tables given in [25] and [26]. 
3.3.1.3 Radiated Heat Loss 
The radiated heat loss of a conductor is given by die expression 
where f is the constant of thermal emissivity which is 0.23 for a new conductor and 0.91 for a flat-black well-
weathered conductor. 
3.3.1.4 Solar Heat Gain 
The amount of heat received fiom the sun is expressed as, 
Qx = aQpA'sia(a) 
where Qq is the direct solar radiation on the earth sur&ce in wj Ji^ , /C is the projected area of the conductor, 
and a is the solar-absorption coefficient This is 0.23 for the new conductor and 0.97 for the black conductor. 
In the case of a round, horizontally placed conductor, the effective angle of incidence of the sun's rays, a, is 
given by, 
a = cos"' [cos cos(Z^ - Z,)] 
where is the altitude of the sun above the horizon, is the azimuth of the sun, and Z, is the azimuth of 
the conductor.^ 
3.3.1.5 Dynamic Heat Balance Equation 
When an increase in current occurs suddenly in a conductor, the conductor temperature does not rise 
instantaneously because of the heat capacity of the conductor. The required time at each current level for the 
conductor temperature reaching the steady state level is approximately 60 minutes [29]. This time delay 
depends on the specific heat capacity of the conductor, the weight, and also the ambient weather conditions. The 
time-temperature characteristics of ACSR is expressed [27] as a first-order differential equation according to 
Equation 3: Conductor Heating 
Heat stored _ Heat gained from R Heat lost via radiation 
in conductor and solar radiation and convection 
or 
® Z/ = 180° for a north-south line. 
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Equation 4: Dynamic Heating Model 
P^ = I^R{9)+Q^ -Q,{0,0j-Q,{0,0„,u) 
where P = 4.I86(4S3.6)(C|fFi+C2^2) is the heat capacity of the conductor, Q is the specific heat capacity of 
aluminum, fF, is the weight per unit length of aluminum, Cj is the specific heat capacity of steel, ^2 
weight per unit length of steel, and ^  is the instantaneous conductor temperature. 
3.3.2 impacts of Thermal Overload 
An elevation of the conductor temperature may bring about both mechanical and electrical effects. Three 
primary factors must be considered when defining the thermal limit of a power line [39]: sag, loss of strength, 
and limitations of the conductor fittmgs. We assume that properly designed, selected, and installed fittings are 
not limiting factors for the thermal limit [39]. Hence, only the significance of sag and loss of strength are 
considered in this dissertation.' 
3.3.2.1 Loss of Clearance due to Sag 
The thermal expansion caused by the increase of temperature can result in the line dropping beneath its 
safety clearance (see Figure S.) Under certain conditions, this may cause flashover to the ground, resulting in a 
ground fault, outage of die circuit, and weakening of the system with the possibility of cascading events or a 
severe underlying human injury. This was the case in the well-known July 2,1996 WSCC outage where a 345-
KV line sagged and touched a 15 ft tree [38]. Hence, the impact, which depends on whether flashover occurs, is 
a function of line temperature. The limiting condition for sag is that line temperature should not exceed a 
limiting temperature for which the line sags through all of the designed safety margins, as specified by the 
National Electrical Safety Code (NESC) [40]. 
We express the temperature corresponding to this limiting condition as 0^ =^MDT'*'^ gl^s ^ where 
^MDT is maximum design temperature at which a designed safety margin Mg is maintained, and is the 
sagging coefficient which represents the increasing sag due to the temperature rising by \°C . We then express 
the impact of sag as. 
Equation 5: Impact of Loss of Clearance 
^ 1 0 otherwise 
' Other impacts, such as fitting fMlures, can be analyzed and included in a similar way as the impact we 
consider in this dissertation. 
^ Other sag-temperature model can be found in [41], [42], [43], [44], and [45], where both the elastic and 
melastic conductor elongatim such as creep are considered. 
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where Ini[Faiilt] is the impact (or financial cost) cotrespondmg to an outage of die overloaded circuit This 
hnpact is dependent upon operating conditions, and its quantification requires analysis by power flow and 
stability simulation. Generally, however, if a circuit is so heavily loaded that it sags and flashes over, it is likely 
that the unpact of its outage will be substantial and highfy undesirable. Therefore, we set Im[Fault] to be very 
large. 
Figure 5: Conductor Sag 
The safety clearance by the NESC [40] is specified large enough so that under most conditions, the 
probability of occurrence for a flashover is extremely small. However, when weather conditions are extreme 
(high ambient temperature and little wind) or during an emergency short time overload when current is very 
high, this probability increases and the risk of sag can be substantial. 
3.3.2.2 Loss of Strength due to Annealing 
Annealing, the recrystallization of metal, is a gradual and irreversible process when the grain matrix 
established by cold working is consumed, causing loss of tensile strength [46]. When fully recrystallized, the 
metal would be in the softened state as it was before cold working. Whenever the line's remaining strength 
decreases to the tensile load, it indicates the end of service life, and thus replacement of the line is required. The 
conductor's expected total life, therefore, is the amount of time for the conductor strength to reach the tensile 
load, under the condition that the conductor operating temperature is always maintained at its maximum 
allowable temperature. For instance, the projected or anticipated total life of the conductors in New York state 
is 25-40 years [28]. But a higher annealing rate caused by higher operating temperatures will accelerate this 
process and therefore reduce the lifetime of the conductor. 
20 
Conductor strength reduction curves as a fimction of both conductor temperature and time is illustrated in 
Figure 6. The rate of strength loss varies with conductor operatmg temperatures, as illustrated by these curves.' 
The expressions to describe this phenomenon have been presented in references [42], [46], [47], and [48]. 
When the conductor operating temperature is higher than the maximum allowable value 9^^, the 
annealing rate is greater than that for which it was designed, and therefore the conductor's expected life 
decreases. The annealing unpact of thermal overload is proportional to this decrease of expected life. We 
compute the decrease in expected life as the difference between the overload time interval r during which time 
the conductor operates at a temperature when conductor strength reduction is and the 
expected time t required to lose this same amount of strength at the design temperature 9Mm • denote this 
decrease m expected life as ^ = t-T. 
100 
€ 
s 
n  
I Bmdt 
Service Hme 
Figure 6: Illustration of Loss of Life by Strength Reduction Curve 
When computing risk for continuous operation at an elevated temperature 0>0MDr, we have that 
t = tci^Mor) and r = so that is given by 
A/ = 
where (d) is the remaining conductor life for conductor continuous operation at 9 ,  during which time the 
conductor strength reduces fix>m the present strength to its tensile load, and ^ expected remaining 
* The tensfle load shown in Figure 6 may decrease with an increase of line sag based on a hyperbolic function of 
line sag. 
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amductor life for continuous operation at 9i^^, when the same amount of strength (denoted as 
= r^)) is lost. 
When computing risk for temporary operation at an elevated temperature 9  > , A/ is given by ' 
Vc(^A<Dr)-*'cW otiierwise 
where r, is the temporary overload time interval at the operating temperature d > 9^^, during which time the 
tensile strength reduces by &Sj(9,r^), is the time required for the same amount of strength 
reduction when the conductor operates at the design temperature 9^^j-. 
In both cases, the annealing hnpact of thermal overload is then given by 
Equation 6: Impact of Loss of Life 
Im i 9 )  =  •^xC 9>9MaT 
otherwise 
where C, is the cost of re-conductoring the circuit, and /q =^c(^AiDr) expected remaining conductor 
life. 
3.3.3 Probabilistic Model 
3.3.3.1 Probability Distribution of Conductor Temperature 
Because of the uncertainty of ambient conditions, the probability density function of conductor temperature 
9 is governed by the joint probability fimction of ambient conditions. 
• Continuous Loading 
For the continuous loading case, given the current, the probability of conductor temperature being 9  is the 
summation of the joint probability of all ambient conditions'" (z) such that die temperature determined by 
them under the given current /, by the steady state thermal balance Equation 2, is ^, i.e.. 
' If the temperature 9  or temporary overload time is so high that the conductor's strength "quickly" 
decreases to its tensile load within the time r, the problem degenerates to the continuous case. 
There are many combinations of wind speed and ambient temperature that result in a particular conductor 
temperature under the current /. 
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Eqnatioa 7: Probability Function of Conductor Temperature under Continuous Loading 
Pr(40 = ZPr(r) Vr6fe:^(r,/) = tf} 
• Short-Ume Emergency Loading 
When an increase in current occurs suddenly in a conductor, the conductor temperature rises according to 
its time-temperature characteristics of Equation 4. When a conductor eventually reaches its steady state 
temperature, i.e., ^ = 0, this equation degenerates into Equation 2 as shown in Section 3 J.1.1. 
Given a short-time emergency (STE) overload, which could be much higher tiian the continuous rating, the 
conductor temperature does not necessarily reach a level determined by the steady state thermal balance 
Equation 2 during the short time interval r. Therefore, to determine conductor temperature after a short-time 
overload, one needs to consider the line temperature prior to the overload, and the temperature increase during 
the time mterval r. Equation 8 provides the probability of the conductor temperature, given a short-time 
overload current I during the time interval r. 
Equation 8: Probability Function of Conductor Temperature under Short-Time Loading 
Here 6^ is the conductor temperature just prior to the short-time overload. 
• Long-Time Emergency Loading 
It may be of interest to sustain an overload for time periods greater than 1 hour, e.g., for 3 to 4 hours. In this 
case, the dynamic behavior of conductor temperature is negligible, since this time frame is longer than that of 
the time-temperature transient period. The probability expression is then the same as that of the continuous 
loading. 
3.3.3.2 Probabilistic Model of Ambient Conditions 
The temperature of the line is influenced by the ambient conditions, but detailed analysis of thermal 
mechanics is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In the analysis presented, three major Actors: ambient 
temperature, wind speed, and solar radiation are considered. The random behavior of air temperature and 
wind speed u are modeled as Normal and Weibull distributions [34] and [35] respectively, as in Equation 9, 
where the optimal parameters of distribution fimctions can be obtained using point estimation [14] from 
historical data. 
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Eqaation 9: Probability FnnctioD of Ambient Conditions 
?Tie„\fi,cr) = -J 
Pr(w|r.^ = J 
la'-
Here, f t ,  < j ,  y  and ^ are the scale and shape parameters for both distributions. They can be estimated by the 
mediod shown in the following section. 
The solar radiation is assumed constant, since its influence is relatively small. Therefore, the vector z used 
in Equation 7 and Equation 8 consists of die air temperature d„ and wind velocity uThe joint distribution of 
z is the product of the distribution flmctions of 6„ and u, which is 
We would emphasize that the assumption of these probability functions is only a prior distribution that will 
be discussed in the chapter on decision-making. The probability density fiuction (PDF) of such a distribution 
may vary significantly from the near-normal distribution due to the non-noimal PDFs of the individual 
meteorological distributions. To obtain a "true" or "near-true" probability distribution is a continuous task for 
both statisticians and engineers. A better estimation of the distributions provides better information for the 
decision-maker. However, one typically has to make the decision before all facts are completely known. This 
means one is unable to obtain all the knowledge (moments) of the true distribution function but rather only a 
limited set of moments or even only a mean value. Even if we obtained a "perfect" function to describe the 
historical statistics of weather completely, whether it would fit the future condition is still questionable. For our 
risk analysis, a particular form of probability fimction does not influence the method used in computing the risk, 
which is the expected value of impact. Using computers, the expected value can be computed from any 
distribution fimction, even if there is no analytical form for the fimction. Meanwhile, we expect the prior 
distribution fimction will be continuously updated based on any posterior information and knowledge, as 
explained in Chapter 6. 
3.3.3.2.1 Parametric Estimator of Normal Distribution 
The mean and variance of a Normal distribution can be estimated by the sample mean and sample variance 
Pr(^ = Pr(^„|«)xPr(K) 
[14]. 
" More variables may be included in the vector z if desired for use in more detailed models. 
If the correlation between each other is negligible, then we have Pr(z) = Pr(&g)x Pr(u). 
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f*l 
= 
Jf-l 
where JT, is one of the n samples from a Nwmal distribution. 
3.3.3.2.2 Parametric Estimator ofWeibull Distribution [18] 
The PDF of a Weibuil distribution is given by 
The Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) can be obtained by integrating this PDF function with respect 
to the random variable x. 
FxiAr.m = J 
X<x 
= \-e " 
This leads to 
= rln(x)-hi(^ 
Then we have a linear transformed fimction: 
y = r*z-\D{fi) 
where y = In 
z = In 
hi- 1 
I.O-F^(x) 
x) 
The slope (_/) and the interception ( - In ^  ) can be obtained by a linear fit shown in Figure 7. The parameters 
of the Weibuil distribution are then estimated. 
Traoosf onned Samples 
slope 
•a 
z 
Figure 7: Parametric Estimation of Weibuil Distribution 
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3.3.4 Risk of Thermal Overioad 
3.3.4.1 Thermal Risk Incurred by a Single Conductor with a Given Flow 
Risk, which is the expected impact of an event, is the product of the event's probability and its impact For 
our case, the event is thermal overload, i.e., temperature of conductor being greater than the permissible value, 
and the risk is the expectation of costs that may result. Given the current I, we may compute thermal overload 
risk as the probability of the temperature being greater than > times its related impacts, i.e.. 
Equation 10: Thennal Risk of a Given Flow on a Single Conductor 
Riskil) = £(Im|/) 
= fPr( |^/)x(lm^( |^/)+Im^(tf|/))/^ 
Here,  ^ is the conductor temperature which is influenced by the line current / together writh the ambient 
conditions, Pr(d | /) is the conditional probability density function (PDF) of the conductor temperature 0 given 
I, and Risk(I) is the risk regarding this line loading. 
3.3.4.2 Thermal Risk Incurred by a Transmission Network with a Given Operating 
Condition 
Given an operating condition of the transmission network X, the thermal risk associated with this 
condition is calculated as the expected thermal impact, i.e., the conditional expected impact under line flow 
times the probability of line flows, based on the Bayes' Theorem [14], 
Equation 11: Thermal Risk of a Given Operating Condition 
RiskiX) = £(Im|JO 
= "f£:(ImJ/,)xFr(/J^ 
= "f/?«*(/,)xPr(/, I Jf) 
where £(Im | AT) is the total expected thermal impact of die operating condition . It is the sum of all the 
expected thermal impacts from each transmission line; n,j  ^ is the number of lines in the concerned 
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transmission area, the Riskil/) is the expected thermal impact on an individual Ime which is calculated &om 
Equation 10; Pr(/| j is the probability of line cunent given a particular operating condition. 
To compute the thermal risk for a system operation condition, we need to answer the following questions; 
1. How much is the probability of a line current given a system operating condition? 
2. How much is the thermal risk on each line when the line current is given? 
We have answered the second question in Section 33.4.1. The probability of a line flow is dependent on 
the uncertainties of system operation. There are contingendes, load fluctuations, load correlation on buses, and 
other deviations of system parameters. 
3.3.4.2.1 Risk of Thermal Overload with Uncertainty of Contingencies 
In this case, the probability fimction of line flow depends on the probabQity flmction of contingencies given 
that the post-contingency line flow can be uniquely determined by the contingency. Then, 
Risk(X) = Y. |£4)xPr(£4 1^ 
where n—^ j. is the number of possible contingencies, is the k-th contingency, k = Q represents the no-
contingency case whose probability is (1.0 - X is the post-contingency flow on the line /. 
3.3.4.2.2 Risk of Thermal Overload with Uncertainty of Loads and Other Parameters 
Besides the uncertainty of contingencies, the loads and other system parameters may be uncertain. The 
method of estimating the risk of thermal overload under these uncertainties is similar to that used in estimating 
the risk of voltage insecurity in Chapter 6, where both bus voltages and line flows can be obtained through a 
power flow solution. 
3.4 Illustrations 
3.4.1 Component Analysis 
3.4.1.1 Deterministic Data 
The example consists of a 1000ft "Drake" conductor 795 kcmil 26/7 ACSR, and for every 1°C 
temperature mcrease, the sag of the line increases by 0.6". The conditions in Table 1 are used to compute the 
27 
Table 1: Deterministic Conditions for Computing Line Ratings 
Ambient Air Temperature ) 40. "C 
WindSpeed(») 2. ft/s 
Maximum Design Temperature (.Omdt) 100. "C 
Table 2: Example of Condactor Ratings by Deterministic Method 
Maximum Temperature Ratings (A) 
Normal lOCC 992 
LTE 115''C, 3hrs 1140 
STE 125''C, 15niin 1310 
deterministic tbennal ratings. The line ratings, by the deterministic method of IEEE standard [25], are listed in 
Table 2. 
3.4.1.2 Probability Distribution of Ambient Conditions 
Ambient conditions are not always as severe as asswned in calculating the deterministic ratings. Suppose 
that the mean and standard deviation of air temperature and wind speed around this conductor, according to 
historical data, are as listed in Table 3. Their probability density functions using Equation 9 are shown in Figure 
8. We see that air temperature of 40"C is beyond four standard deviations of its mean, so that its probability is 
less than 10~*. 
For the long transmission line, the ambient conditions tend to vary along the line. If, however, we assume 
that the statistical description of this variation is uniform along the line length, then the probability that a 
particular ambient condition happens at one location is the same as the probability that this condition happens at 
another location (not necessarily at the same time). We can still use the statistics at one location to describe the 
weather distribution along the entire line. Otherwise, we should use the data collected at the location where the 
ambient conditions are statisticaUy most critical. 
Table 3: Statistics of Ambient Conditions 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Air Temperature, "C 
Wind Speed, ft/s 
15 6.3 
3.5 13 
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Figure 8: Joint Probability Density Function of Ambient Conditioiis 
3.4.1.3 Probability Distribution of Conductor Temperature 
Conductor temperature is a function of current as well as ambient conditions (see Equation 2 and Equation 
4). Even when Ae line carries its deterministic limiting current, its temperature is typically below its maximum 
design value • Figure 9 shows that conductor temperature in most cases varies &om 11" C to 13%"C with 
different ambient conditions when continuous limiting current (992^) flows through the line. We see that only 
for very high temperature and very low wind speed, does the temperature exceed 9,^^ which is 100°C. 
The distribution of conductor temperature when the line carries its continuous limiting current is shown in 
Figure 10. It shows that the average conductor temperature is 61.8''C, which is much lower than the maximum 
design value (lOCC). The probability of the temperature being greater than 100"C is only about 1 percent 
( 0.011). This is why the deterministic rating is thought to be very conservative, and it provides motivation to 
consider increasing this rating beyond 992^4. One way to determine the rating increase is to compare the 
additional risk to the additional benefit In what follows, we illustrate how to compute additional risk. However, 
benefit assessment is dependent on line location and the economics of power transmission, and it must be done 
on a case-by-case basis. Another way to determine the rating increase is by applying the equal risk criterion. 
This is the approach we will illustrate in Section 6.4.1. 
29 
Figure 9: Conductor Temperature under Various Ambient Conditions 
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Figure 10: Probability Density Function of Conductor Temperature, given I = 992(A) 
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3.4.1.4 Thermal Risk of a Given Loading Level 
Combming the distribution of temperature with its potential impacts, the risk for various current levels is 
calculated using Equation 10. The results are shown m Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13 where the sagging 
impact is assumed much higher than that of die conductor's annealing.'^  
3.4.1.4.1 Thermal Risk of Continuous Loading 
For the continuous loading, the risk of thermal overload incurred by the conductor is shown in Figure 11. It 
shows the risk of thermal overload incurred by the conductor running at different levels of continuous current. 
This thermal risk increases with the increase of line loading. The figure also shows that the risk of the 
deterministic continuous rating is not zero, since the ambient condition could be more severe than that of the 
deterministic AO'C air temperature. Because this small amount of risk has been accepted implicitly in die 
industry, we will use it to identify ratings associated with temporary overload. 
3.4.1.4.2 Thermal Risk of Temporary Overload 
Figure 12 shows the iso-risk contours for the long time emergency (LTE) overload that lasts more than one 
hour.'^  With a higher risk level, the equal risk contour for the conductor loading expands to the right of the plot. 
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Figure 11: Risk of Carrying Continuous Over-Current 
" We choose 100 times the single line re-conducting cost as the flashover impact, which depends on the 
importance of the conductor m the whole system. 
The overlostd time can be arbitrarily defined. In general, it could be any time appropriate to the situation. 
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which means the conductor can tolerate more ciurent under a temporary overload vntfaout mcrease of risks. It 
can also be observed fipom Figure 12 that the time-inverse effect of iso-risk curves become inelastic because 
heavy loading makes the sag become the dommant hurt, which does not depend on overload duration for long 
run to the conductor. 
Figure 12: Risk of Long-Ttme Emergency Overload 
When the duration of overload is less than 60 minutes, the conductor temperature will not reach a steady 
state value due to the influence of temperature transient behavior. Therefore, the probabUity of the conductor 
temperature exceeding the allowable temperature is reduced, and current levels are higher for the same level of 
risk. 
If the conductor initially operates at the continuous loading at 992A with the mean conductor temperature 
of 6l.8''C, the iso-risk contours for this short-time overload are shown in Figure 13, where the curve for O.OOS 
risk'® varies from 1225A to 1700^4 according to duration of short-time overload. The figure shows the 
conductor can tolerate more overload current and longer time if a higher risk is accepted. When the dynamic of 
conductor tempo^ture calms down, the risk curves converge to those corresponding cioves in the LTE risk plot 
(Figure 12). 
The value of risk is normalized by the line's re-conducting cost. 
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Figure 13: Risk of Short-Time Emergency Overload 
3.4.2 System Analysis 
The system analysis is a modified IEEE RTS-96 system [49]. The local transmission area that we are 
particularly interested in is the area that contains line 130-120, 230-120, and 230-130. The line flows of each 
line under difierent line outage conditions are shown in Figure 14, Figure 15, and Figure 16, where the system 
load is proportionally allocated throughout the entire system, and the change in load is followed by the 
generation at 230. The probabilities of these outages are listed in [49]. We also assimie those 230 KV lines have 
the same thermal characteristics as assumed in Section 3.4.1, and they have the same re-conductoring cost of 
S108,000 per mile. Under these assumptions, the deterministic continuous, 3-hour and IS-minute temporary 
ratings are 395 MVA, 454 MVA, and 521 MVA, respectively, according to Table 2. We can compare these 
ratings and the line flows in Figure 14, Figure 15, and Figure 16 to get an intuitive feeling of overload risk. 
Figure 17 shows the quantitative risk of transmission line thermal overload against various system load 
levels. This is illustrated in a semi-log plot. As expected intuitively, the line 120-230, in this case, suffers much 
more risk of overload when load level is more than 3400 MW. The line 130-120 has little risk of overload. The 
line 230-130 has negligible overload risk that cannot even be shown m the same risk plot of the other two lines. 
Figure 18 shows the total transmission lines overload risk in our specified local area under various system 
conditions. With the current load level of 3200 MW, the area's transmission line overload risk is almost nothing 
Oess than S10~^ per hour) which indicates the local area is not a transmission line constrained area. 
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Figure 15: Flows on Line 230-120 
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Figure 18; Risk of Overload in a Local Area 
3.5 Summary 
A systematic approach to measuring the risk associated with the thermal overload is presented in this 
chapter. The approach and its components are illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The probabilistic ambient 
models, the evaluation of probability distribution of conduction temperature, and the corresponding impacts are 
addressed. FinaUy, the method to evaluate the risk and how to apply the risk assessment into transmission line 
thermal ratings are also discussed. 
The quantitative measurement of thermal risk is helpfiil for the operator in trading off the benefits and costs 
in a competitive utility environment. The risk function can also be included, along with a benefit term, in the 
optimization functions to reach an optimal decision for power system operation. 
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4 VOLTAGE RISK ASSESSMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Problem Statement 
The vohages in a power system are required to be maintained within such a range that they satisfy the 
requirements of electric customers and are stable under any disturbances. However, a voltage collapse may 
occur on power systems that are heavUy loaded, weakened by transmission outages, or subjected to reactive 
power shortages. This association vnth reactive power deficiencies may result in uncontrollable system-wide 
voltage collapse, loss of loads, and blackout 
4.1.2 Previous Work 
The prevailing practice in industry of providing energy to customers and avoiding voltage insecurity is to 
maintain a deterministic reliability margin on bus voltages, reactive power requirements, transfer capabilities, or 
system loading levels such that the system can survive the collapse under any single component failure. 
Figure 19 is a typical plot of several P-V curves used in analyzing a vohage-constrained network.'^  
The solid line is a P-V curve for a case without any contingencies. It shows the maximum loading 
capability as 4070 MW if no contingency occurs. With the possibility of contingencies, the P-V curve typically 
becomes more restrictive. The most constraining contingency in this case gives a maximum loadability at 3689 
MW. At this operating point, the system is not safe enough because a small deviation in system conditions 
together with the outage of the line 230-120 will result in a collapse of the entire system. In setting the operating 
guidelines, a safety margin, for example, 3%, is selected, and the total capability is established. The available 
capability is then the distance between the current operating point and the security boundary discounted by the 
safety margin (Figure 19). This procedure effectively avoids the collapse by creating a firm boundary against all 
the "dangerous" possibilities. However, it does not provide answers to the following questions: 
• Risk Quantification: How safe or how risky is the current system's operating condition?'* 
• Trend: How does the risk change as the operating conditions are relieved or stressed? 
" Some reliability councils may have other requirements. However, maintaining a deterministic security 
boundary is a widely accepted de facto reliabilify criterion. 
The system for which these curves are obtained is described in Section 4.4.2. 
" The available capability, that is the distance between the security boundary and the current operating point, is 
usually mtuitively thought to be a measure of a system's safeness. However, one still does not know what the 
real difference is between 10 MW and 100 MW of available capability. The question is what will happen, and 
what will the consequences be in these situations? 
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• Security-Economy Tradeofif: How is increased risk associated with heavier use of f^ilities of&et by the 
corresponding mcrease in benefit? 
We wish to develop a risk index for voltage insecurity that provides a quantitative justification of system 
reliability in terms of the system economics. There have been numerous techniques and indices in measuring 
the voltage stability problem. We generally classify them into deterministic and probabilistic methods. 
a M a K xr a M 
System load Lnei (X100MW) 
Figure 19: P-V Curves at a Load Bus 
4.1.2.1 Deterministic Method 
Most of the previous work on voltage stability study is by the deterministic method where there is no 
uncertainty considered in the analysis. Performance indices of voltage ([19] and [51]) are used often with 
satisfactory results in many on-line or off-line security assessment tools. Other indices, such as Sensitivity 
Factors, Singular Values and Eigenvalues, Loading Margin and Closest Loadability, Tangent Vector bidex, etc., 
have been proposed, as siumnarized by Dr. Canizares in [52]. Recently, some researchers have presented their 
results by using first and second order approximation to the loading margin to estimate the loadability, for 
example [53], and Available Transfer Capability (ATC). We would like to mention briefly the loading margin 
and the margin sensitivity techniques because they closely relate to our approach where these deterministic 
techniques are used probabilistically to compute the (Hobability of voltage collapse. 
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4.1.2.1.1 Loiulmg Mar^  and Margpi Sensitivity 
Tor a particular opetating point, the amount of additional load in a specific pattern of load increase that 
would cause a voltage collapse is called the loading maigin to voltage collapse. Loadmg margin is the most 
basic and widely accepted index of voltage collapse. Every paper on voltage collapse indices uses loading 
margin as the horizontal scale when the performance of the index is graphed" [52]. As shown in Figure 19, the 
loading margin to vohage collapse is the change in loading between the operating pomt and the nose of the P-V 
curve. There are basically two methods to obtain the loading margin: Continuation Power Flow ([54], [55], and 
[56]) and Direct Methods" ([54], [56] and [57]). The advantages, listed in [52], of the loading margin as a 
voltage collapse index are: 
• The loading margin is straightforward, well accepted, and easily understood. 
• The loading margin is not based on a particular system model, but can be used with either static power 
system models or (fynamic system models. 
• The loading margin is an accurate index that takes full account of the power system nonlinearity and limits, 
such as reactive power control limits encountered as the loading increases. Limits are not direcdy reflected 
as sudden changes on the loading margin. 
• Once the loading margin is computed, it is easy and quick to compute the margin sensitivity with respect to 
any power system parameters or controls ([60], [61], and [62]). 
• The loading margin accounts for the pattern of load increase.^ 
The disadvantages of the loading margin as a voltage collapse index are [52]: 
• The loading margin requires the assumption of a direction of load increase. 
• The loading margin requires computation at points away from the current operating point and hence, are 
computationally more expensive than indices only using information at the operating point 
As mentioned earlier, the margin sensitivity with respect to any power system parameters or controls 
developed in [60], [61], and [62] can be computed easily as long as a loading margin is obtained. It can also 
alleviate the dependence of the loading margin on an assumed pattern of load increase and can be used in the 
probabilistic assessment as described in our approach. 
4.1.2.2 Probabilistic Method 
As mentioned in [64], "there are comparatively few applications of probabilistic analysis to voltage 
stability problems." References [9], and [63] through [70] measure the probability of voltage instability and the 
corresponding indices. For the voltage collapse problem, [9] measures the probabUity of the system demand 
" The voltage collapse problem can be stated as an optimization problem ([58] and [59]) that allows for the use 
of the well-known optimization techniques such as Interior Point Methods, Lagrangian Methods, etc. 
^ This can be viewed as a disadvantage as well. 
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moving beyond die system collapse boundaiy. The economic significance of security using the Expected 
Demand Not Served (EDNS), Expected Unserved Energy (EUE), and Expected Outage Cost (EOQ are also 
discussed in [9]. Reference [63] calculates the (Hobabili^ and fisquency of vohage instability and the expected 
voltage stability^ margin by examining its vohage stability indicator at any load bus exceeding a threshold vahie 
during outages. On the other hand, a probabilistic load flow method based on linearization of AC power flow 
equations is used to assess the vohage instability reflectmg the random variation of loads, generation 
uncertainties, dispatching effects and outages in [64]. The voltage standard deviations and the vohage/reactive 
mjection sensitivities ^-] are proposed as efiTective voltage collapse indices. Other indices include, a 
probabilistic evaluation of die load margin based on Tangent Vector and Monte Carlo simulations given in [65], 
and an expected voltage instability proximity using ^-] sensitivities discussed in [68]. References [66], [67], 
and [69] apply Interior Point and Lagrangian optimization techniques probabilistically in solving for voltage 
stability problems. Such mdices as the Probability of Unsolvable Cases G'UC), Loss of Load Expectation 
(LOLE), and Instability Risk Factor^* at PQ buses are proposed. The previous work on probabilistic power flow 
(see [6] and [7]) can also be treated as a probabilistic method on voltage insecurity. They provide the 
probabilistic description of system voltages when system does not have voltage collapse problem. 
4.1.3 Our Approach 
In this dissertation, a method that combines both probability and impact calculations is developed. The 
technique provides the risk of voltage insecurity where the deterministic loading margin and margin sensitivity 
method is used in the probability calculation. The risk, which indicates the expectation of the cost consequence 
associated with two voltage insecurity problems of voltage collapse or voltage-out-of-limit,^ may be effectively 
used to make decisions regarding the system operation. 
Our risk assessment generally consists of two issues: probability and impact evaluations. This method is 
decomposed into two tiers of assessments; "component" and "system" assessments. The component assessment 
gives a detailed study of the impact at each bus under given bus voltages. The system assessment, however, 
with consideration of system uncertainti'es, gives the voltage risk of a given operating condition for a desired 
region. Both assessments are discussed and illustrated in the following sections. 
4.2 MeUiod Overview 
The objective of our approach is to assess the risk associated with the voltage insecurity given an operating 
condition. The purpose of the component assessment is to evaluate the voltage risk at a single load bus with a 
given bus voltage. Its result will be used in the system assessment that measures the possibility of both voltage 
It is defined as the probability of maximum active power demand less than actual load demand at a PQ bus 
m. 
It is not a deterministic voltage limit as treated by other reliability assessment 
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collapse and vohage-out-of-Iimit under a system-wide environment. Both assessments relate to the evaluation of 
probability and its impact. 
4.2.1 Component Voltage Risk Assessment 
The component voltage risk is the expected impact of load interruption at a load bus given a specified bus 
voltage where the cost consequence of voltage insecurity is evaluated in detaO. It indicates die amount of money 
that one can expected to lose due to load interruption under a given bus voltage. Two measurements are needed 
to evaluate this bus-oriented risk under given voltage levels: probability of service interruption and expected 
interruption cost The risk at the bus is the product of these two measurements. 
Given a bus voltage, the amount of load being interrupted at a bus depends on whether this voltage exceeds 
the tolerance of the load connected to the bus or not With the statistically distributed load characteristics for 
various load classes in an aggregated bus load, the tolerance, (h* the interruption voltages of an aggregated load 
becomes random. The probability that this random load tolerance covers the given load voltage, leads to the 
probability of the load being served or not being interrupted. Multiplying the probability that a load does lead to 
interruption and the expected interruption cost it gives an expectation impact on the load of this bus due to the 
possible insecurity risk of Ae given voltage. The illustrative diagram of component voltage risk study is shown 
in Figure 20. 
For each bus, the component study gives a "risk-voltage" plot which encapsulates the detailed study of 
expected voltage impact at this bus. It will be used in the system study where the probabilistic bus voltages, and 
hence the risk, are obtained via the uncertain system conditions. 
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Figure 20: Diagram of Component Voltage Risk Study 
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4.2.2 System Voltage Risk Assessment 
The result of component assessment provides a detafled, bus-oriented expected impact if a particular 
vohage profile occurs. However, the bus voltages are determined by the operating condition and other system-
oriented factors, such as contmgency, system load deviation, load distribution factors on each bus, and so on. 
The purpose of system voltage risk assessment is to estimate the voltage risk for a given operating 
condition under these uncertainties. In contrast to the component voltage risk assessment where the major task 
is to evaluate the expected impact of a voltage profile at a bus, the major task of the system voltage risk 
assessment is to obtain the probability description of the vohage profiles throughout buses. The final result of 
system assessment, Le., the risk, is obtained by combming both the system-induced probability assessment and 
the component-induced impact assessment 
From the viewpoint of the entire system, we assume that there are two distinct outcomes for the fiiture 
performance of system voltages, i.e., whether they collapse or not. The bifurcation point shown on the P-V 
curve provides the boundary between these two outcomes. With the system operating without suffering a 
voltage collapse, the voltage may still go beyond the tolerance of loads, resulting in service interruption. Our 
risk includes both these outcomes. 
Equation 12: General Expression for Voltage Risk 
Risk = Pr(Collapse)*lai(Collapse) + Precollapse)* \m{NoCollapse) 
By Equation 12, the risk assessment includes two issues: measuring the probability of collapse and the 
expected impact of both collapse and out-of-Iimit. 
According to the operating condition and future uncertainties, different buses have different voltage levels 
with the associated probabilities. Applying the bus-oriented risk-voltage curves fix}m the component smdy, we 
can then determine the total system risk by aggregating the associated bus risks weighted by the occurrence 
probability of bus voltages. The illustrative diagram is shown in Figure 21. 
4.3 Analytical Development 
In this section, we give the details of the voltage risk assessment. We first develop the component voltage 
risk assessment for a single bus, and then the system-wide voltage risk assessment. 
4.3.1 Definition 
We define the "risk," as a condition under which there is a possibility of an adverse deviation from a 
desired outcome that is expected or hoped for [1]. There are two primitives included within this definition: 
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Figure 21: Diagram of System Voltage Risk Study 
future uncertainties and impact of outcomes. Furtfaennore, we define the degree of rislP as the expectation^ of 
the dollar-based impacts of these outcomes, which would be the amount of impact multiplied by the 
corresponding probability of outcome. 
4.3.2 Component Voltage Risk Assessment 
The objective of component voltage risk assessment is to find the voltage risk at a bus under a given bus 
voltage. With a given voltage, the risk evaluated measures the probability of the service being interrupted and 
the cost consequence associated with this interruption. The result is provided by a bus-oriented risk-voltage 
curve such that different buses have different risk-voltage curves according to the associated load mix and 
service interruption costs. 
4.3.2.1 Load Intemjption Voltages 
In situations where under- or over-voltage protection is widely used in both power system's distribution 
networks and vdthin the load itself, the distribution components and the loads are protected fix)m over-current or 
other potential damage due to unacceptable load voltage. Additionally, cascading voltage collapse is avoided by 
employing load-shedding schemes which will automatically trip the individual load or load groups. Under these 
conditions the voltage violates its set threshold leading to service interruption of users whose services have been 
° We will use the term "risk" to mean die degree of risk in the later sections. 
^ Expected value is a measure of risk m the theory of "risk management," although other measures, such as 
probability and variance, can be used to quantify the degree of risk [1]. 
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tripped ([71] and [23]). Also, some loads may drop ofifby themselves without any action of protective relays 
when voltage is unsustainable. 
Table 4 [72], summarizes the examples of interruption voltages due to distribution protections. 
Because the load interruption voltages are equipment dependent, they should be modeled mdividually. 
However, an entnre distribution system is usually modeled as a single aggregated load at a bus in typical power 
flow and stability studies. This aggregated load at a bus is the composition of many individual loads with a 
number of load characteristics. 
Table 4: Electric Service Deviation Tolerances for Load-And-Control Equipment (72] 
Device Voltage Level 
Communication Equipment 
Computers, Data Processing Equipment 
Contactors, Motor Starts 
Lighting 
Fluorescent 
Incandescent 
Motors, Standard Induction 
Resistance Loads, Furnaces, Heaters 
Others 
±5% 
± 10 % 
- 15% to+ 10% 
- 10%,-25% 
+ 18% 
± 10 % 
Variable 
Reference [73], [74], and [75] present component-based methods to specify an aggregated load model, 
where the load characteristic of interest is the sensitivity of real and reactive power to voltage, rather than load 
interruption vohage. In these approaches, the load mix is specified for each bus in terms of residential, 
commercial, and industrial classes.^ This data could be derived from customer billing information or other 
statistics and simulations. 
The component-based approach is attractive because it provides for an upward aggregation of the available 
information, i.e., the load class mix data, into the model to be used in the study. It also avoids the tedious work 
of modeling each individual load by grouping similar loads into class or subclasses. The same approach can be 
used to model load interruption voltage. 
We assume that the load mix model at a bus is specified as in [73]. Additionally, we fiuther assume the 
interruption voltages within a load class c are normally distributed. That is. 
Equation 13 : Probability Distribution of Interruption Voltage 
" If detailed information of load mix is obtained, the load can also be classified on a subclass level, like 
resistance heating, room air conditioner, lighting, water heating, etc. 
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where both the lower and upper tolerance limits ( and withm load class " c " are randomly distributed 
with mean and and standard devi^ons and (Tujc)- These parameters can be estimated 
through load statistics as in Table 4. 
4.3.2.2 Probability of Service Interruption 
The service interruption at a bus occurs when the bus voltage is beyond the sustainable limits of the 
individual loads. The probability of the load class "c" being interrupted under a given voltage level is 
computed as: 
or \V^) 
where both and are randomly distributed as in Equation 13. 
As shown in Figure 22^ the shaded area satisfies the condition yL^<yyus<yu.c- An integral of the joint 
probability of the random and on this area represents the probability that the load class " c " is served. 
Therefore, the probability of service interrupted is 1.0 minus this probability of load being served. 
I 
Vbus 
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Figure 22: Probability of Load Being Served 
4.3.2.3 Expected Impact of a Given Voltage 
With as the percentage share of a load class c at a particular bus, the expected service interruption 
impact is its expected service interruption cost multiplied by its expected interruption amount. If we sum up all 
the load classes at a bus, we have 
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Equation 14: Expected Impact at a Bus with a Given Voltage  ^
C 
where is the (forecasted) total amount of load at a particular bus, is the percentage share of a load 
class c in Pi„, E(K^^)xPt(V[ ^ or \ represents the expected amount of service 
interruption in load class c; is the service interruption cost associated with the load class c at this bus. 
The independence of Ci^^, and is used in Equation 14. The expectation of service 
interruption cost for each load class EjC^^) is obtained by regression methods [17] based on customer 
survey or historical data. References [3] and [76] give a summary and survey on these cost evaluations. Other 
publications on evaluating load interruption cost of residential, commercial, or industrial segments can be found 
in [6] and [7]. The probability temi, or |  V^), has been given in Section 432J2. 
4.3.2.4 "Risk - Voltage" curve 
With various levels of bus voltage. Equation 14 can give a risk-voltage curve that shows the voltage risk 
against different voltage levels at a bus. This procedure can be done bus by bus without knowing the operating 
condition of the entire power system. 
4.3.3 System Voltage Risk Assessment 
The objective of system voltage risk assessment is to Hnd the risk associated with voltage insecurity for a 
local region or an entire system under a given operating condition. With a given operating condition, the risk 
measures both the probability of voltage insecurity (voltage collapse and voltage-out-of-limit) and the 
associated cost consequence. 
4.3.3.1 Assumptions 
• We invoke the assumption usually made for security assessment, i.e., a short-teim operating condition is 
given. The objective of this chapter is to determine the "risk" of voltage insecurity under this operating 
condition. 
• The given operating condition has a strong correlation with the condition in the near future. We can predict 
the expectation of the future condition very well so that the variation of the future condition is small and 
some linear approximations are valid. 
^ We use the notation PT(A | B) to represent the conditional probability of event A under the given condition 
B. Similarly, E(A) will be the expected value of A, and E(A | S) is the conditional expectation of A given 
B. 
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• The variation of the future condition away from its expectation, except for the contingencies, is due to 
small parametric deviations. They m^ include deviaticm of load distribution lactms, load power factois, 
line parameters, and so on. 
• The steacfy state model of the power system is assumed. We are mterested in the post-contmgency 
performance after an uncertain disturbance occurs. 
• Some assumptions on the probability distribution are made. They include a Poisson distribution of 
contingencies, Muhi-Variate Nomial (MVN) distribution of parametric deviations and Normal distribution 
of load interruption voltages. The description of these distribution functions can be found in References 
[IS] and [16]. 
• The occurrence of contingencies is independent of each other, and it is also independent of other system 
parametric deviations and the operating condition. The individual parametric deviations, e.g., deviations of 
the real or reactive load distribution &ctors at each bus are considered correlated depending on the 
statistical data of these deviations. Other uncertainties outside the power system are assumed independently 
distributed. 
• The impact of contingency is assumed to include the influence of voltage-out-of-limit and its direct effect 
in terms of customer load interruption. We do not include any sympathetic effects that might lead to loss of 
additional components. 
4.3.3.2 Framework for Risk-based Voltage Assessment 
We assume that there are two distinct outcomes for the future performance of system voltages, collapse or 
no collapse. The bifurcation point shown on the P-V curve provides the boundary between these two outcomes. 
When the system is operating without suffering a voltage collapse, the voltage may go below the tolerance of 
loads, resulting in load interruption. Our general risk expression includes both of these outcomes. 
Equation 15: Voltage Risk of a Given Operating Condition 
Risit(Xo) = £(Im|A-o) 
= PT(Co//qpselXo)xE(lni(Co//i^e)) + 
[l .0 - PT(Co//i9)se I Jfo )lx £(lm(AfoCo//flpse)) 
where Xq stands for the current operating condition. The risk, RisACXg), depends on the probability of 
voltage collapse PT(Co//apselXo) under the condition ATq , the expected impact of collapse E(lm(Co//apse)), 
and the expected impact of no collapse (or impact of voltage-out-of-limit), E(lm(NdCo//(^ se)). 
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We will address each of these tenns in the foUowing sections. We drop the notation of the given operating 
condition Xg in the following derivations for simpUcity. The reader should be aware that all the derivations are 
based on Xq , i.e., all of the expressions are functions of Xq . 
4.3.3.3 Probability of Voltage Collapse 
There are several uncertainties associated with the voltage collapse under the scope of short-term operating 
time &ame. They are (1) contingencies, (2) short-term system load, (3) short-term parametric deviations, e.g., 
deviations of load distribution factors, generation dispatch, and other parametric uncertainties if desired. 
4.3.3.3.1 Contingency 
The occurrence of a contingency, by assumption, follows a Poisson distribution, i.e., 
Equatioa 16: Probability Distribation of Contingency 
Ef ~ Poisson( Xjt) 
where the A, is the occurrence rate of the contingency £,, the time frame r is the time used to estimate our 
fimire risk, i.e., we are assessing the operating risk within the next t hours. 
4.3.3.3.2 Short-term Load Fluctuation 
Besides contingencies, the expectation of load drift and variation may be another uncertainly in the near 
future. A short-term load forecast provides an expectation of system load level and its standard deviation 
. By our assumption, it is normally distributed,^ as illustrated by 
Equation 17: Probability Distribution of Load 
L ~ <j\) 
4.3.3.3.3 Short-term Parametric Deviation 
In reality, the load distribution &ctors among load buses, load power factors, generation participation 
factors, and other system parameters will not be certain in the future, even though we may forecast or estimate 
them very well. We assume that 
" Most regression and load forecasting models implicitly assiune the normality in their statistical models. 
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• Ae parameters are random in the future, and they follow a MuM-Variate Normal (MVN) distribution 
around their expected values, and 
• die deviations of parameters, although random, are small such that linear approximation of maxiinmii 
loadability with respect to these randmn parameters is valid. 
Let us denote the expectation of these parameters as E(JCp) ,  where the parametric column vector 
virtually may include all the possible system parameters, such as load distribution fectors, generation 
participation factors, and so on. 
Based on the given expectation of E{Kp), Le., a given parametric pattern, a Continuation Power Flow 
(CPF) or other techniques ([S3], [SS], [S6], and [57]) will provide an expectation of maxfmiim loadability 
£(£„ ) and the margin sensitivities 5^, with respect to these parameters ([60], [61], and [62]).^ Then, 
according to the second assimiption in this section, 
= E{L^)+S],^{Kp-E(^p)) 
where is the system's maximum loadability, this is now random due to the random parameters Kp . 
By the normality assumption of the parametric deviations, ^p follows a Multi-Variate Normal distribution 
with mean vector E(Kp ) and variance-covariance matrix Wp. 
Equation 18: Probability Distribution of Parameters 
Kp -  MVN{E(JCp) ,  Vp )  
where E{^p) is the vector of expected system parametric scenario, and Vp is the variance-covariance matrix 
of these parameters. The elements of the variance-covariance matrix represent both the variances of each 
parameter and the correlation with respect to deviation of other parameters. This matrix can be estimated from 
the sample statistics of historical data [14]. 
It can be proven that L„i, a linear fimction of the MVN distributed Kp also follows a Normal distribution 
[16], Its expected value is E{L^), and the variance is x Vp x5p 
The probabUity distribution of maximum loadability is therefore. 
^ This has been discussed in Section 4.1.2.1.1. 
^ Reference [16] has a thorough proof of the theory of linear models in statistics. 
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Equation 19: Probability Distribiition of Maximom Loadability 
L., - iv(£(£^). Sj:xV;.x5,) 
and it depends on the value of the parameters, their variability, and how they cmrelate with each other. 
4.3.3.3.4 Probability of Collapse 
Under a given topology determmed by a contingency, when both load level L and maximum loadability 
are random, the probability of voltage collapse is the probability that the loading margin M,=L^-L is 
negative. The probability distributions of L and are obtained through Equation 17 and Equation 19, 
respectively. Since both are Normal distributions, the resultant loading margin will be also Normally 
distributed, with a mean of fi^ and a variance of . That is. 
Equation 20: Probability of Collapse under a Contingency 
?x{Collapse\ Ei) = Pr(A/< <0 !£;) 
where the random loading margin Mj = - L has a Normal distribution, and 
Equation 21: Probability Distribution of Loading Margin 
Mmi 
Through the use of the Total Probability Theorem [14], the total probability of voltage collapse under the 
system exposed to uncertain contingencies is 
Equation 22: Probability of Collapse 
Pr{Collapse) = J^PTiCoilapse\ Ei)xPTiEi) 
B, 
where the conditional probability ?T(<Collapse\ E i )  and the probability of contingency, Pr(£,), are given in 
Equation 20 and Equation 16, respectively. 
so 
4.3.3.4 Expected System Impact With and Without Voltage Collapse 
4.3.3.4.1 Expected Impact Without Voltage Collapse 
Section 4323 gives the expected impact under a given bus vohi^e. The bus voltage, however, also 
(fepends on (1) contmgencies, (Z) short-term system load level, and (3) short-term parametric deviations. 
Ahhough a particular load model is not assumed in the voltage risk analysis, a component-based load model 
like in [73], [74], and [7S] can be used since the information of load segments have been obtained. 
With small deviations of system parameters, a linear approximation of voltage around its expectation is 
assumed such that a Multi-Variate Normal distribution of bus voltages is obtained. 
voltage does not collapse, the expectation of bus voltages L,Ei) is obtained by solving the power flow 
based on the expected system condition, and the contingency Ej, Vp is again the variance-covariance matrix 
of parametric deviations as defined in Section A3333. 
With the above Normal distribution of bus voltages, the expected voltage impact for the study system at a 
given load level and given contingency is 
where £(Im |^K^) is given in Equation 14, and Pr(K^) is the Normal probability density function 
provided in Equation 23. 
Under exposure to the uncertain load level and contingencies, the expected impact of voltage-out-of-limit 
when voltage does not collapse is 
Equation 23: Multi-Variate Normal Probability Function of Bus Voltages 
where is the sensitivity matrix of bus voltages with respect to the variation of system parameters. If the 
£(Im|/;,£,) = Y.\v 
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Equation 24: Expected System Impact withont Voltage Collapse 
EijmiNoCollapse)) = 5:(ft^ 0®|£,£,)xPr(i)fl!L)xPr(£,) 
which himps all the possible contingencies^ and the possible load drifting. The probability function of a load 
leveU Pr(L), and a contingency, Pr(£j), are given in Equation 16 and Equation 17. 
4.3.3.4.2 Expected Impact with Voltage Collapse 
It is possible to mitigate the impact of voltage collapse via corrective or restorative operating actions. It is 
also possible that partial interruption can mitigate the voltage colI^)se and prevent fitll interruption. However, 
the effectiveness of these actions is very uncertain. Therefore, we assume here that voltage collapse results in 
total system blackout 
The expected impact is then the interruption cost of the entire system's load, i.e.. 
Equation 25: Expected System Impact with Voltage Collapse 
where all the loads in the system and all the load components at a bus are interrupted. 
4.3.3.5 Riskof Voltage Insecurity 
Both the probability and impact terms in Equation 15 have been given in Equation 22, Equation 24, and 
Equation 25. The result, which is the voltage risk associated with the given operating condition A'q, can be 
used for 
• a quantitative measurement of voltage insecurity for any operating point It is usefiil as a decision-making 
aid in determining operating limits associated with voltage problems. 
• a risk curve with respect to various system conditions to find the trend of voltage risks. 
• a marginal risk wnth respect to each transaction or injection which may be used to price the congestion. 
Since the risk represents the expected cost associated with the insecurity problem, it can give a market 
^ Theoretically, one must include all contingencies here, but practically, one only includes the "credible" 
contmgencies. 
Ei^ miCollapse)) = li 
bMS\ c 
52 
incentive to mitigate the congestion. The collective revenue based on these price incentives can be 
aOocated to the real congestion victims, for example, the interrupted customers. 
4.4 Illustrations 
4.4.1 Component Analysis 
For a simple illustration, we assume an aggregated load at a bus has 100% residential load '^ with mean 
interruption voltages at 0.85 (lower mean), 1.15 (upper mean), and a 0.02 of standard deviation. Based on the 
lower mean of the interruption voltage of this residential load class, one can expect at least half of the load to be 
shut off when the voltage goes below 0.85. On the other hand, more than half of the load can be expected to be 
lost if the voltage is too high, for example in this case, higher than 1.15. 
The expected cost consequence or impact of load interruption at this bus under various voltage levels is 
computed by Equation 14 and shown in Figure 23, where an expected cost of S50 per MWhour for an average 6 
hom^ service interruption is assumed for this residential load. 
This bus oriented" component analysis can be done off-line based on the statistical data of load mix and 
their interruption costs. It is independent of the following system risk assessment and more detailed infonnation 
and assessment on service interruption impact can be studied here. The result is given by a risk-voltage plot at 
each bus and then used for system voltage risk assessment. 
4.4.2 System Analysis 
We provide an illustration of the proposed risk analysis on a modified IEEE Reliability Test System (lEEE-
RTS 96) [49]. We h-we chosen a scenario where three contingencies, each one being an outage of a 
transmission line, provoke voltage inseciu^ty^ on the load buses. An illustration of the system diagram is shown 
in Figure 24. 
The load mix assumption is purely for simplicity. Adding more load classes according to a real load statistics 
does not change the general shape of Figure 23. Summation of c=l and the summation from c=l to n in 
Equation 10 and 11 do not have much difference except for data required and computational result 
^ To obtain the E(C^^) in Equation 14, a simple linear regression on interruption duration has been assumed 
here such that gx r = 50 * 6. Generally, it may be any nonlinear function, such as exponential 
function of the duration t where other regression methods on t could be used. 
" The componmt analysis in Chapter 3, "Transmission Line Thermal Overload Risk Assessment", is line-
oriented instead of bus-oriented here. 
^ Here, we only consider the voltage problem. However, these contingencies may also cause thermal overload 
and transient instability in the system. Our generalized approach provides uniform measurement in assessing the 
composite risk associated with all three types of securi^ problems ([21], [37], and [77]). This attractive feature 
of the approach will be illustrated in Giapter 5. 
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Figure 23: Risk-Voltage Plot at a Bus 
Figure 24: Local Illustration of IEEE RTS 96 System 
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The time frame of interest is one hour. Under this time frame, we assume the forecasted expectatioif^  of the 
future system will be the same as the current operating condition. The standard deviadra of this future load 
level is assumed to be 2%. We further assume the deviation of load sharing factors on each bus to be the 
parametric variation that has 5% standard deviations around the expected values. The occurrence of 
contingencies is estimated from annual outage rates for the cotrespondnig transmission line. Both the 
probability of each contingency, including that of no-contingency condition which is E*r(£j), and die 
corresponding maxmnim loadabillty based on expected system parameters are listed in Table 5. 
Table 5: Loadability under Various Contingency Conditions 
Contingency Occurrence Loadability 
Probability (xlOO MW) 
No outages 0.9999 40.70 
Outage 130-120 4J8e-5 39.14 
Outage 230-130 4J8e-5 37 J2 
Outage 230-120 4J8e-5 36.89 
The value of outage rates we assumed here is for simplicity and for illustrating the different effects even 
when the outage rates are the same. One should improve the accuracy of these values by relating them to line 
length or actual histoncal or real time data of each line. 
4.4.2.1 Probability of Collapse 
Suppose that the current load level is at 3600 MW, and the load sharing factors on each load bus are as 
listed in [49]. We wish to compute the probability of voltage collapse under the current operating condition. 
With 2% standard deviation, the true load has 95% probability of fluctuating within an interval of 
3600 ± 1.96 X 72 MW.'® (see Table 6) 
Table 6: Randomness of System Load 
Expected Load Level Standard Deviation 
36.00 X 100 MW 0.72 X 100 MW 
Furthermore, the system load may be distributed among load buses with different load sharing factors, the 
5% standard deviations of load sharing factors cause the P-V curve or the maximum loadability to be uncertain. 
The randomness of the loadability under different contingencies is listed in Table 7. They are obtained from 
" We emphasize that this is only an expectation because the future system will almost always deviate from this 
forecasted system. 
55 
Equation 19. The randonmess of load margin, the distance between the random maximum loadabiliQr, and the 
random load level for each contingency in Equation 21, ate given in Table 8. Based on the Normal distribution 
of load margin, we can obtain the probability of collapse under each contingency which shows mdeed die 
probability of the random load margin as being less than zero. The results are listed in the last column of Table 
8. 
Table 7: Randomness of Loadability due to Uncertain Load Sharing Factors 
Contingency 
Occurrence 
Probability 
Expected Standard 
Loa^ility Deviation 
(X 100 MW) 
No Outage 
Outage 130-120 
Outage 230-130 
Outage 230-120 
0.999 
438e-5 
4J8e-5 
4.58e-5 
40.70 03839 
39.14 0.4179 
3732 03970 
36.89 03353 
Table 8: Randomness of Load IVIargin 
Contingency 
Expected Standard 
Margin Deviation 
(X 100 MW) 
I>robability 
of Collapse 
under Contingency 
No Outage 
Outage 130-120 
Outage 230-130 
Outage 230-120 
4.70 0.8160 
3.14 0.8325 
132 0.8225 
0.89 0.7942 
43e-9 
8.0e-5 
0.0547 
0.1306 
The probability of collapse over the next hour, for the load being 3600 MW, is therefore only 8.5 x 10"®. It 
is calculated by summing up all the products of collapse probability under contingency and the probability of 
the corresponding contingency, i.e., 
8.5x10"® =0.9999•43x10"' +4.58x10"' *8.0x10"' +4.58x10"' •0.0547 + 4.58x10"' *0.11306 
Figure 25 provides plots of collapse probabilities against different loading levels under each contingency 
(including "no outage" cases). We also show the total probability is the sum of the collapse probabilities 
weighted by the contingency probabilities. 
^ 1.96 is in the 95"* percentile of a standard Normal distribution, and 72 MW is the standard deviation of load 
that is obtained by 3600x2% MW according to our assumption. 
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4.4.2.2 Expected Impact 
4.4.2.2.1 Expected Impact ofNo-Collapse (Voltage-Out-of-Limit) 
It is possible that the vohage may decline below the load's tolerable range when it is still stable. As a simple 
Qliistratioii, we assume all the load buses have identical load class mix, say 100% residential load with mean 
interruption voltage at 0.85 (lower mean) and 1.15 (upper mean), and a 0.02 of standard deviation, as assumed 
in the example of component assessment. The expected cost consequence or impact due to voltage-out-of-limit 
under various load levels is shown in Figure 26. This result is obtained by combining" both the expected P-V 
curves as in Figure 19 and the expected mterruption curve as in Figure 23. 
The impact curve in Figure 26 suggests the potential cost of load interruption due to voltage-out-of-limit 
under the condition that the system does not suffer the voltage collapse problem. It is represented by the term 
Eifm{NoCoUapsei) in Equation 15. It shows that the risk of voltage out-of-limit is increasing with the system 
is stressed more demand for electricity, eihhough the voltage is still stable at this time. This is because the 
system voltage level decreases with increase of load level as shown in the P-V curve m Figure 19. 
" Given a load level, we will have a voltage level as illustrated in Figure 19. This voltage, by looking up Figure 
23, will lead to some amount of expected impact of load mterruption at a bus. Therefore, we arrive at the plotted 
graph in Figure 26. 
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Figure 25: Probability of Voltage Collapse 
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Figure 26: Impact of Voitage-Out-of-Limit (No-Collapse) 
4.4.2.2.2 Expected Impact of Collapse 
For the impact of collapse, we assiune the outcome wUl be an entire system blackout as mentioned in 
Section 433.4J2. The rate of cost consequence is also uniformly assumed as S50 per MWhour for a flat 
expected duration of 6 hours. When load level is at 3600 MW, this impact is expected to raise the cost to be 
S1.08 million per hour. 
4.4.2.3 Risk of Voltage Insecurity 
Through Equadon 15, a semi-log plot of risk associated with voltage problems is depicted in Figure 27. It is 
the simi of two parts; risk of collapse and risk of voltage-out-of-limit with no-collapse. 
The left boundary of the shaded area in Figure 27 is the worst-case single contingency security boundary. 
This is the traditional firm security limit of this system. The right boundary of the shaded area is the no-
contingency limit. The solid curve of total risk, which indicates the expected impact of voltage insecurity 
problems, including both voltage collapse and out-of-limit, varies with the different loading levels of this 
system. The risk of losing voltage stability and voltage limits gets higher when more load is demanded in the 
system. 
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Figure 27: Voltage Risk against Various Load Levels 
4.4.2.4 Marginal Risk of Voltage Insecurity 
With the result of risk, one may compute the marginal risk with respect to any desired parameters to obtain 
risk sensitivities. One application of this marginal risk is for the system control to find an optimal preventive 
scheme to mitigate the risk of voltage insecurity. 
It is also of interest to use the marginal risk wnth respect to system participants or transactions in order to 
price or allocate the congestion cost to each participant In this case, we interpret the risk as an expected cost 
due to possible transmission congestion problems, in contrast to the real production cost resulting from the 
transmission loss, because reliability has a price. The risk is an additional implicit cost to the real cost of energy 
delivered with the possibility of security problems. Then the marginal risk represents an incremental congestion 
cost due to incremental transmission participation, specifically in the delivered energy. It can be used as 
• a price signal to price the transmission congestion, and 
• an allocation factor to allocate the revenue collected by congestion cost to congestion victims. 
Figure 28 plots a marginal risk against various loading positions. For example, it suggests an expected 
S4.2S per MWhour of additional implicit cost charged for the possibility of losing voltage security when the 
system is running at the level of 3600 MW. It also shows the maricet participants should be priced more 
congestion cost when the system is stressed by more load demand. 
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Figure 28: Marginal Risk against Various Load Leveb 
4.5 Summary 
A probabilistic method to compute the operating risk of voltage collapse and voltage-out-of-Iimits is 
presented in this chapter. The resulting risk represents the expected future cost of voltage insecurity based on 
information from the current operating condition. It gives a quantitative measure of voltage insecurity both 
within and outside the traditional security boundary. It is promising in its potential to 
• quantify a composite risk in hybrid security problems, 
• act as a leading indicator for reliability, and 
• &cilitate the pricing of power system security. 
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5 COMPOSITE RISK ASSESSMENT 
5.1 Intmduction 
5.1.1 Problem Statement 
As expressed m Chapter 1, within the electric network, an individual disturbance with non-zero cost 
consequence may occur for any number of reasons or at any time in any system environment The disturbance 
may result in power system security problems: thermal overload, voltage mstabUity, or transient instability, and 
draw the prevailing system to an uncontrollable cascading situation leading to widespread power outages. To 
maintain system security or reliability, certain transfer limits are required regardless of the economic forces 
behind the markets. 
From an operational viewpoint, however, transmission corridors are substantial power market influences, 
i.e., the choice of one limit over another for a transmission corridor can translate into millions of dollars for the 
selling and buying entities. By seeking profit in the market environment, energy marketers need as much 
transfer capability as possible to deliver their energy &om one place to another for profit 
Our interest is motivated by this contradiction induced by the recent changes in regulatory policies towards 
inter-utility power interchange practices with a major focus on "competttion" as a replacement of "regulation" to 
achieve economic efficiency. Instead of "regulating" the market by traditional firm, non-economic, obligatory 
security rules, the new environment is seeking an economic signal or lever that reflects the system security such 
that it can adjust the behavior of market participants to allow the "free" market to satisfy the security 
requirement by itself 
5.1.2 Previous Work 
Reliability indices have been defined to monitor the frequency and duration of outages. As stated in [78], 
"There are two basic categories of indices: customer based indices and load based indices. Customer based 
indices record the frequency and duration of outages frtr individual customers and are most informative in 
mainly residential areas. Load based indices monitor ir^brmation on the duration and frequency of interruption 
of load and are relevant for circuits that are mostly industrial or commercial." Many indices have been 
developed mainly for the adequacy assessment in [6] and [7], Again, from [78], "The most commonly used 
indices are the System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), the System Average Interruption 
Duration Index (SAIDI), the Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI), and the Average Service 
Availability Index (ASAI)." Also, there have been numerous works conducted in power system security 
assessment that provide various security indices for a power system. The performance index ([19] and [SI]), as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, measures the security level of a system condition based on the deviation of branch 
flows and bus voltages from their normal values. In addition to the review of probabilistic approaches to power 
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system security assessment in Section 2.1, [79] proposes a probabilistic security index for die purpose of 
identify operating limits. Reference [80] uses a method called "generalized tetrachoric series" to calculate the 
statistics of eigenvalue locations based on the sensitivities of the eigenvalues. It may be used for a probabilistic 
assessment of small-signal or oscillatory stability. References [81] and [82] discuss the probabilistic transient 
stability analysis. 
However, all of these indices, both performance and probability indices, treat the power system security as 
the deterministic obligation to the system operation. Most of them do not have, or do not need to be concerned 
with the significance of economics or the cost related to the security. 
5.1.3 Our Approach 
In this chapter, we use the results in Chapters 3, and 4 and other related work ([83] and [84]) to build a 
composite risk index for power system security. This index reflects the expected economic loss due to possible 
system security problems that manifest themselves in three different forms: thermal overload, voltage 
inseciurity, and transient instabUity. Because the risk indices developed for each security problem have a 
uniform economic meaning, i.e^ the expected monetary impact or cost consequence of the insecurity, they are 
additive and hence, become a composite risk index that reflects the overall security level for a given operating 
condition. 
5.2 Method Overview 
We develop a two-tiered approach to conduct the composite risk assessment for a given operating 
condition. The two tiers are the "component" assessment and the "system" assessment. In component 
assessment, we evaluate the expected impact or cost consequence on an individual power system component, 
for instance, a transmission line, a transformer, or an aggregated bus load, under various given electrical 
conditions of the component In system assessment, we focus on evaluating the power system uncertainties that 
have influence on the electrical conditions of the system components, given a system operating condition. The 
result is given as a composite expected monetary impact of a given operating condition over the next period of 
time considered. The following sections illustrate how this approach works. 
5.2.1 Component Assessment 
In component assessment, the objective is to assess the consequence, as well as monetary cost associated 
with each power system component, given an electrical condition for operation. A component assessment 
measures the expected impact incurred by each victim under possible insecure conditions. Such a study assesses 
lines, transformers, loads and generation units. 
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5.2.1.1 "ComponenT Risk on Transmission Line under Given Line Rows 
As described in Cbapto' 3, a given flow through a transmission line may result in thermal overload of the 
conductor, and hence, result in related physical damages and even human injuries. The cost consequence or the 
impact of this thermal overload has been presented m detail in Chapter 3. Moreover, it has been also discussed 
that the possible overload depends not only on the given line flow, but also on the ambient weather around the 
transmission line. An expected value of the overload impact, by die probabilistic description of ambient weather 
conditions, is calculated as the "component" overload risk for the given line under the given load flow. This 
procedure can be repeated under various line flows such that a "risk-flow" curve is created for a transmission 
line. 
The component assessment encapsulates the detailed impact calculation and thermal model of a 
transmission line into its final risk-flow curve such that one can determine the expected monetary impact on a 
transmission line &om its line flow without knowing its intrinsic physical properties and financial cost It is also 
convenient for the component assessment itself that it does not need to know what happens on the power 
system. What does matter for the component study is the line flow, in other words, "give me the line flow, and 
I'll tell you how much money you are going to lose based on the weather condition." 
The risk-flow curve is created on a line by line basis. Each transmission line has its own risk-flow based on 
its local weather condition and physical properties. 
5.2.1.2 "Component" Risk on Transfomier under Given Flows 
As described in [83], a given flow through a transformer may result in elevation of the temperature of 
winding and insulation, and hence, bring about possible loss of life and equipment damage on the transformer. 
The elevation of temperature is dependent on the uncertain ambient weather conditions. Thus, an expected 
monetary cost consequence of transformer overload is calculated as the component overload risk by the 
probabilistic description of ambient weathers. This procedure is repeated under various flows such that a risk-
flow curve is created for a transformer. 
Similar to the component assessment of a transmission line, a transformer's risk-flow curve encapsulates 
the detailed internal thermal model and probabilistic impact calculation. In this way, on the system side, one can 
determine the monetary loss only by the transformer loading level without any knowledge of the intrinsic 
properties of the transformer. 
The risk-flow curve is created for each transformer based on its local weather condition and physical 
properties. 
5.2.1.3 "Component" Risk on Load under Given Bus Voltages 
In Chapter 4, it has been demonstrated that the end users of electriciQr may be interrupted under out-of-
limit voltage. Different load classes have different distributions of voltage tolerance and interruption cost. 
Under a given bus voltage, an expected monetary impact on customers due to service interruption is calculated 
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as the component vohi^e risk at a bus based on its aggregated probabilistic description of load interruption 
voltages for the load mix at the bus. This procedure is repeated under various bus voltages such that a risk-
vohage curve is provided for a load bus. 
This component voltage risk study for a bus encapsulates the detailed evaluaticm of expected impact and 
load mix into its final risk-voltage curve such that one, on the system side, is able to determine the expected 
monetary impact on a bus by only providing the mformation of bus volt^es. 
The risk-voltage curve is created for each bus in a transmission network according to its local load mix. 
5.2.1.4 Component Risk on a Generator under Given System Conditions 
In [84], neural networks have been developed for the power system stability study. Given a system 
condition, the synchronism of a generation unit depends on the general occurrence of a fault, fault type, and 
fault location. 
This component stability risk study encapsulates the time consuming stability simulations into the resultant 
neural networks such that one, on the system side, is able to quickly determine the stability of a generator 
through feeding the system condition and contingency into the trained neural networks without performing 
tedious stability studies. 
The component stability study and neural networks training are conducted for each unit such that trained 
neural nets are available for each generation unit for the ongoing system risk assessment of transient stability. 
5.2.2 System Assessment 
A higher tier above the "component" assessment is the "system" assessment whose objective is to provide a 
composite security risk over the next period of time under a given system condition. An illustrative diagram is 
shown in Figure 29. 
5.2.2.1 Risk of Overload and Voltage Insecurity 
A contingency analysis is used in the system assessment to provide the branch flows and bus voltages 
under a set of credible contingencies. For each contingency, the resultant flows and voltages are fed into the 
risk-flow and risk-voltage curves, which are created by the component assessment, to obtain the risks of 
overload and voltage insecurity under the contingency. The risk of each insecurity problem is finally calculated 
by summing up all the contingency risks with weights of contingency occurrence probability. 
5.2.2.2 Risk of Transient Instability 
The operating condition is also fed into a stability risk assessment, as described in [84], to obtain the risk of 
transient stability. A sum of all the risks for each msecurity problem is ultimately calculated as the composite 
risk of the given operating condition. 
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Figure 29: Diagram of Composite System Risk Study 
5.3 Analytical Development 
5.3.1 Component Assessment 
The detailed analytic developments of component studies for the risk of transmission line thermal overload, 
voltage insecurity, and transformer overload are in Chapter 3 and 4 and References [83] and [84], respectively. 
They are briefly stated in Section S.2.1. The reader can refer to the related chapters for a detailed description. 
5.3.2 System Assessment 
5.3.2.1 Definition and Goal 
We have defined the "risk," as a condition under which there is a possibility of an adverse deviation from a 
desired outcome that is expected or hoped for [1]. There are two primitives included within this definition; 
fixture uncertainties and impact of outcomes. We also defined the "degree of risk" as the expectation of the 
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dollar-based monetaiy" impacts or cost consequences of those outcomes. It would be the amount of impact 
multiplied by the correspondmg probability of outcome. 
Our goal is to evaluate the de^ee of risk of losing power system security under a given operating 
condition. The degree of risk is measured by the expected cost consequence of insecurity over a short period of 
time considered, say over the next hour. 
5.3.2.2 Assumptions 
The composite risk assessment is developed for providing a risk-based power system security assessment. 
It represents the so called "insecurity cost" of an operating condition. The assumptions are the same as those 
listed in Section 433.1 where voltage risk is assessed. 
The assumed probability distributions are treated as "prior" distributions whose distribution parameters, for 
example the mean and variance in a Normal distribution are estimated from the historical data, or even 
subjectively. Therefore, the emphasis is on the method to evaluate the risk based on a probabUistic description 
of uncertainties rather that what the probabilistic description really is. It is believed that any "prior" probability 
distribution can be improved by the "posterior" distribution when additional information is provided [85]. 
5.3.2.3 Risk Expression 
As addressed in Chapter 4, we assume there are two distinct outcomes for the future performance of system 
voltages, collapse or no-collapse. The model of steady state power system determines whether the system has 
stable steady state equilibrium points under various uncertainties such as contingencies or not. In the case when 
the voltage collapses, or the system does not have a "post-contingency" equilibrium, it also has no basis for the 
transient stability, which is considered a large signal stability problem. Our general risk expression is then as 
follows: 
Equation 26 : Risk Expression 
RiskiXo) = £(Im|^o) 
= PriCollapse | A'g ) x E{]m(Collapse)) + 
[l .0 - PriCollapse | A'q )]'< E(jm{NoCollapse)) 
where XQ stands for the current operating condition. The risk, RiskQXo), depends on the probability of 
voltage collapse PriCollapse \XQ) under the condition A'q , the expected impact of collapse E(jm(Collepse)) 
and the expected impact of no-collapse EifmiNoCollcqjse)). 
We do not consider the individual's utility fimction of die monetary impacts. 
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We will address each of diese terms in the following sections. We drop the notation of the given operating 
condition Xq in the following derivations for simplicity. The reader should be aware that all the derivations are 
based on Xq , i.e., all of the expressions ate functions of Xq . 
5.3.2.4 Probability of Voltage Collapse (Losing Equilibrium) 
The detailed derivation of probability of voltage collapse is in Chapter 4. We simunarize it as follows: 
Equation 27: Probability of Voltage Collapse 
?T{Collapse) = J]Pr(Co//£ j^el £i)xE^£j) 
where the conditional probability 9tiCollapse \ E() is the probability of collapse under a given contingency 
, Pr(£j) is occurrence probability of the contingency. Both are given in Chapter 4, where any other system-
wide uncertainties, '^ for instance, system load level, load distribution factors, branch parameters, and so on, 
could be included in the term WjCollapse | £/) • 
5.3.2.5 Expected Impact of Collapse 
The consequence of voltage collapse is not only the interruption of loads but also the shutdown of 
generation units or even an entire plant This is because the system is also transient unstable if it does not have a 
stable equilibrium point Hence, in the case when system load level moves outside the bifurcation point of a PV 
curve, there are non-zero unit tripping costs associated with it 
As explained in Chapter 4, it is possible to mitigate the impact of voltage collapse via corrective or 
restorative operating actions. It is also possible, and perhaps inevitable, that partial interruption can mitigate the 
voltage collapse and prevent fiill interruption. However, the effectiveness of these actions is very uncertain and 
usually results in a series of cascading events. Therefore, we assume here that voltage collapse results in a total 
system blackout which includes blackout of both loads and loss of ail generation. 
The expected impact is then the interruption cost of the entire system loads and generation units. 
Equation 28: Expected System Impact with Voltage Collapse 
Ei^ iCollapse)) = S (^Iro6«,i««/)+Z^0roft«s.Coi) 
bits bus 
For a simplest case where only the uncertainty of contingency is considered, the conditional probability term 
?T{Collapse \ Ej) is deterministically either "0" or "1" according to the operating condition. Most previous 
works on probabUistic voltage stability are based on this simplification. We, however, propose a method to 
evaluate the probability of collapse under any arbitrary random system parameters (see Chapter 4). 
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where EGm,^ ,^ ) is the »q)ected cost consequence of all the loads in the system when interrupted (as 
derived in Chapter 4), ) is the expected cost consequence on generation units when all the 
units in the system are lost The cost consequence, including replacement, repau*, and startup costs, for each unit 
is given m [84]. 
5.3.2.6 Expected impact of No-Collapse 
Under the condition that the voltage does not collapse, there are several possible insecure outcomes when 
the system is exposed to uncertainties such as contingencies, load, and etc. The outcomes include the thermal 
overload of transmission Imes, overload in transformers, voltage-out-of-limit on loads, and transient instability 
on generation units. Each insecurity problem has its own uncertainty dependency and impact characteristics. 
Equation 29: Expected System Impact without Voltage Collapse 
EifmiNoCollapse)) = £(lm(£«ie))+ E{lmiTreinrfonner)+ 
£(lm(^ oaeO)+ E()ia(Generator)) 
where E{ (^fioCollapse)) is the monetary expected impact when voltage is steady state stable, it is the sum of 
expected impact of transmission line overload £(lm(Z.//ie)), transformer overload Ei)m(Tremrformer)), load 
interruption due to voltage-out-of-limit E(lm(Loaef)), and loss of generator due to transient instability 
E(lm(Gena'ator)). 
5.3.2.6.1 Expected Monetaary Impact on Transmission Line due to Thermal Overload 
A detailed derivation of this can be found in Chapter 3 and 4. We summarize its result as follows. The 
expected monetary impact on a line due to thermal overload is given in Equation 30 where the random effect of 
contingency, load drifting and overload impact are explicitly considered. 
Equation 30 : Expected Impact on Line 
E{}ia{Line)) = 2;([^£(Im(//ne)l I,£^)xPr(I)<a,)xPr(£J 
which lumps all the possible contingencies'"' and the possible load drifting. The probability function of a 
contingency, Pr(£,), and a load level, Pr(£r), are given by Equation 31 and Equation 32, '^ respectively, 
according to the assumption in Section S.32J.. 
^ Theoretically, one must include ail contingencies here, but practically, one only includes the "credible" 
contingencies. 
If only the uncertainty of contingency is considered, one may set all the other probability distributions, such 
as probability of load level and system parameters, as 1.0. This will give a simplified case of Equation 30 as 
described m Chapter 3. 
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Equation 31: Probability Distributioii of Contingency 
Ej ~ Poisson{A.it) 
Equation 32: Probability Distiibntion of Load Level 
L ~ NiMc, o-l) 
In Equation 30, the tenn E(\miline)\L,E i ) )  is the expected overload impact on a line under a given 
contingency and a given load level. The randomness of system parameters is represented as their influences on 
the line flows. Therefore, the term E(jmiline) \ L, Ef)) is calculated as, 
E Q m i U n e ) |  £ , ^  \ l u n e ) ^ l i m c ) d l i i n e  
tines 
where £(Im/^ \ J tine) "s given by the risk-flow curve from the component risk assessment of transmission line 
thermal overload. It gives the expected impact on a line under various given flows. The probability of line flows 
Pr(//^), depending on random system parameters under a given contingency and a given load level, follows a 
Normal probability density fimction of line flow which is provided in 
where is the sensitivity matrix of line flows with respect to the variation of system parameters. Under the 
condition that the voltage does not collapse, the expectation of line flows £(/ \L,Ei) is obtained by solving the 
power flow based on the expected system condition. The contingency is the variance-covariance 
matrix of parametric deviations as defined in Chapter 4. This Multi-Variate Normal distribution of line flows is 
derived from the assumption that the system parameters K^p follow a Multi-Variate Normal distribution and 
only have small deviations from the current operating condition. That is. 
Equation 33: Probability Distribution of Parameters 
Kp - hmi{EiKp), V^) 
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5.3.2.6.2 Expected Monetary Impact an Tran^ormer due to Thermal Overload 
Similar to oar dealing with the transmission line, the expected monetary impact on a transformer is given in 
Equation 34. 
Eqnatioa 34: Expected Impact on Transformer 
£(lm(7rans^rnter)) = ]^(('^  £(Im(rrans/&nner)| i,£j)xPr(£)<it)xPr(E^) 
which lumps ail the possible contingencies and the possible load drifting. The probability function of a 
contingency, Pr(£,), and a load level, Pr^), are given by Equation 31 and Equation 32, respectively. 
In Equation 34, the term E{}xa.(Jranrformer) \ L, £;)) is the expected transformer overload impact under a 
given contingency and a given load level. This term is calculated from: 
E(ym(Jransformer^ \L,E,) = J, £(Im^^ \lj^ )PK/ 
xfinn 
where the randomness of system parameters is represented as their influences on the flows of transformers. The 
term £(Im^, | /^,) is provided by the risk-flow curve from the component risk assessment of transformer 
thermal overload risk; it gives the expected impact on transformer under various given flows. Pr(/^) is the 
Normal probability density fimction of flow on a transformer which is obtained in the same manner as is 
described in Section S32.6.1. 
5.3.2.6.3 Expected Monetary Impact on Load due to Voltage-Out-of-Limit 
A detailed description of this is given in Chapter 4. We summarize its result as follows. The expected 
monetary impact on load due to voltage-out-of-limit is given in Equation 35 where the random effect of 
contingency, load drifting, and load interruption are explicitly considered. 
Equation 35 : Expected Impact on Load 
E{^ {Load)) = 5;(f^ £(Im(Z;aK0K,£/)>«Pr(/:)c£L)xPr(£,) 
which lumps all the possible contingencies and the possible load drifting. The probability function of a load 
level, Pr(£,), and a contingency, Pr(iL), are given by Equation 31 and Equation 32, respectively, based on the 
assumption in Section S J.2.2. 
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In Equation 35, the tenn E{^(Load)\L,Ei'i) is die expected load interruption impact under a given 
contingency and a load level. This term is calculated from 
where £(Iin^ | is given by the risk-vohage curve from the component voltage risk assessment. It gives 
the expected impact on load under various given voltages. Pr(F'^ ) is the Normal probabfli^ density function 
of bus voltage which is provided m 
This Multi-Variate Normal distribution of bus voltages is derived from the assimiption that the system 
parameters follow a Multi-Variate Normal distribution and only have small deviations from the current 
operating condition by our assumption. 
5.3.2.6.4 ExpectedMoneteay Impact on Generator due to Transient Instability 
As described in earlier sections, the risk of transient instability in [84] is actually a conditional expectation 
of monetary impact (cost consequence) under the condition that the system does have steady state equilibrium; 
in other words, this occurs under the condition that voltage does not collapse. Consequently, the risk calculated 
in [84] is the expected impact of transient instability in Equation 29. 
As summarized in [84], the expected monetary impact on a generator due to transient instability is 
Equation 36 : Expected Impact on Generator 
The first term represents the conditional probability Pr(/r | A'q ) of occurrence for an event K defined as a 
transient instability of a generator over the next period of time considered, given the operating condition ATq . It 
depends on the occurrence probability of a feult, fault type, and &ult location. The consequences of a transient 
instabUity are evaluated by assessing the direct and indirect financial costs (or impacts) incurred due to tripping 
of units; they depend on generation level, which is one of the parameters in the operation condition . The 
evaluation of the assessment is made from the perspective of a generation company that owns the units that are 
at risk to go out of step. The detailed description of calculating each of terms is in [84]. 
EQm(Load)\L,Et) = 
t 
£(lm(Genera/or)) = Pr(/: | | .^Tq) 
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5.4 Illustrations 
5.4.1 System Description 
We provide an illustration of assessing composite risk on a modified OEEE Reliability Test System GEEE-
RTS 96) [49]. The modification we made includes acUing two dummy buses. Bus #250 and Bus #270, on the 
line 130-130 and 130-120, to simulate various locations of &ult for transient instability study. Other 
modifications on system topology are as the same as that made in [84]. The area 3 which has one generation 
plant connects to Bus #13, three transmission Imes, 230-130, 230-120, and 130-120, two transformers at Bus 
#120, which connect to Area 2 through Bus #90 and Bus #100, and a self-supplied area load at Bus #130. This 
area is a net exporting area that transfers its excess energy through transmission line 130-120 to the boundary 
bus #120, and then to the southern low voltage area #2 via two transformers. We want to find a composite risk 
incurred by this local area for a system operating condition over die next hour. An illustration of the system 
diagram is shown in Figure 30. 
We have chosen a scenario where three contingencies, each one being an outage of a transmission line, 
provoke possible transmission line overload, transformer overload, voltage insecurity and transient instability in 
the area considered.^^ The contingencies and their occurrence probabilities are listed in Table 9. 
As in the illustration of voltage stability, from Chapter 4, we choose the system load level as the variable 
representing the various operating conditions. The result is given by a plot of composite risk levels for each of 
the system load levef*^ to show how the risk evolves along different operating conditions. The successive 
evolution of area load is balanced by a proportional increase of generations throughout the entire system, not 
necessarily within the local area, according to the expected participation factors of generation units. This 
method of identifying the dispatch is an approximation of the full Economic Dispatch Calculation (EDC) which 
would normally be used. In our example, we use the original shares of generation within the total generation 
level as the expected participation factors. For simplicity, we also assiune the system has been provided 
adequate generation reserves for the increase of load such that the real limits of generators are ignored. The load 
sharing and generation participation factors could be either random or even correlated depending on whether we 
expect the randonmess and independence of their effects. We select"*^ these pro rata increase of load and 
generation as the expected sharing factors (Equation 37). If the randomness of these sharing parameters needs to 
be considered, the variance-covariance matrix of these parameters also needs to be estimated for our risk 
assessment, (see Section 43333). In our case, a 5% independent deviation of real load sharing factors is 
assumed. The reactive part of load is, however, assimied to be dependent on the real part of a load. That means 
the power fector is included as fixed values. 
^ The modifications made on the original RTS-96 system are used for the purpose of creating a transient 
unstable case such that all of these security problems can be illustrated simultaneously. 
^ One may choose odier variables, by replacing the load level with other desired variable for the horizontal 
variable of the risk plot, to see its impact on the risk level. 
72 
BU817 
BUS 16 
BUS 13 230 kV BUSU 
BUS 15 
eus^M BUS 11 BUS 12 
BUSIO Byge 
BUS? BUS1 
138 kV 
Figure 30: Illustration of IEEE RTS-96 System 
Table 9: Expected Maximum Loadability under Contingencies 
Contingency Occurrence Loadability 
Probability (xlOOMW) 
No outages 0.9999 66.86 
Outage 230-120 4.58e-5 58.05 
Outage 130-120 4.58e-5 54.51 
Outage 230-130 4.58e-5 65.11 
** One may also use load forecasting and economic dispatch to obtain these fectors. 
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Equation 37: Pro Rata Load Sharing and Generation Participation Factors 
Loal, LDshare, = 
GEN ,^ = ^ 
According to the above scenario, the expected maximum ioadability where the system does exist, 
equilibrium for voltage stability are obtained through successive simulation of Continuation Power Flow under 
each contingency. The results are listed in the last coliunn in Table 9. 
5.4.2 Component Assessment 
In component assessment, the objective is to assess its impact and expected monetary cost associated with 
each power system component, under a given electrical condition for operation. It measures the expected impact 
incurred by each victim under possible insecure conditions. The results are given by the risk-flow and risk-
voltage curves for each individual branch and load bus. 
5.4.2.1 Transmission Line Themial Overload 
There are three transmission lines in the considered area, line 130-120, 230-130, and 230-120. For 
simplicity, we assume all of three have the same thermal, weather conditions, and designed service life theit are 
specified in Section 3.4. According to the deterministic method, the normal (continuous), 3 hour, and IS min 
short-time ratings are 400 MVA, 450 MVA, and 520 MVA, respectively [25]. Figure 31 shows the per unit 
expected impact on line under various flows. For calculating real dollar-based risk, one need to multiply the per 
unit risk by the line's replacement cost per mile and its length. The re-conductoring cost is assumed as SI08,000 
per mile for all three lines. So the only difference on the real dollar-based risks for different lines is by the line 
length in this example. For instance, the expected thermal impact on line 230-120 under various line flows, 
through component risk assessment, is shown in Figure 31. One may continuously run this line at its 100% 
continuous rating level, 400 MVA. This will lead to an expected $10 loss per hour, or $87,600 per year. This 
relatively small amount of monetary loss is due to low occurrence rate of these weather conditions that result in 
line temperature exceeding its maximum design value. 
Figure 31 is obtained regardless of the system conditions, like system load level, contingency, etc. It is 
calculated &om the expected uncertain weather conditions and the line's thermal characteristics under the given 
line flows, regardless of how these line flows are obtained. These risk-flow curves, encapsulating the detailed 
thermal information of individual lines, will be used in the upper tier of system risk assessment 
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5.4.2.2 Transformer Thermal Overload 
There are two transformers in the considered area, transformer 120-90 and 120-100. Both connect as the 
inter&ce between the considered area 3 and the southern area 2. Both are 400 MVA transformers. The weather 
conditions and thermal characteristics of both are assumed as the same, as illustrated in [S3]. For a given load 
level, the real dollar-based expected overload nnpact on each of the transformer is therefore, the same as shown 
in Figure 32. 
In a fashion similar to the component study for a transmission line. Figure 32 is obtained regardless of the 
system conditions. It is calculated fiom the expected uncertain weather conditions and the transformers' thermal 
characteristics under the given operating flows, regardless of how these flows are obtained fiom the network 
condition. These risk-flow curves, encapsulating the detailed thermal information of individual transformers, 
will be used in the upper tier of system risk assessment. 
5.4.2.3 Load Interruption due to Voitage-Out-of-Limit 
There is an aggregated bus load at Bus #130 in the considered area. For a simple illustration, we assume the 
aggregated load at bus #130 has 100% residential load*^ with mean interruption voltages at 0.85 (lower mean), 
1.15 (upper mean), and a 0.02 of standard deviation. Based on the lower mean of the interruption voltage of this 
residential load class, one can expect at least half of the load being shut off when the voltage goes below 0.85. 
On the other hand, more than half of the load lost can be expected if the voltage is too high, e.g., higher than 
1.15 in this case. 
The expected cost consequence or impact of load interruption at the bus #130 under various voltage levels 
is computed as described in Section 4.32., and shown in Figure 33, where an expected cost of S50 per MWhour 
for an average 6 hours service interruption is assumed for this residential load. For instance, one can expect a S3 
per MWhr loss when the voltage drops to 0.9. If there is a 300MW aggregated load connected to bus #130, 
S900 per hour, or S7.8 million averaged per year, is expected to be lost when voltage drops to 0.9. However, in 
this case, less than S0.3 per hour, which is calculated by multiplying the SO.OOl per MWhr by 300 MW, is 
expected to be lost when the voltage is maintained above 0.95. 
Figure 33 is calculated fiom the expected load interruption cost under the given operating voltages, 
regardless of how those voltages are obtained from the network condition. This risk-voltage curve, 
encapsulating the detailed service interruption information of individual loads, will be used in the upper tier of 
system risk assessment. 
^ See Section 4.4. 
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Figure 31: Expected Impact on Lines under Various Line Flows 
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Figure 32: Expected Impact on Transformer under Various Flows 
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Figure 33: Risk-Voltage Plot at a Bus 
5.4.3 System Assessment 
The time &ame of interest is one hour. Under this time frame, we assume the forecasted expectation*  ^of the 
future system, characterized by the system load level^^ as assumed in Section 5.4.1, will be the same as the 
current operating condition. The standard deviation of diis fiiture load level is assumed to be S%. We further 
assume the deviation of load sharing or distribution ^ors on each bus to be the parametric variation that has 
S% standard deviations around the expected values. The occurrence of contingencies is estimated from annual 
outage rates for the corresponding transmission line. Both the probability of each contingency, including that of 
no-contingency condition which is l-O-^^^ and tiie corresponding maximum loadability based on 
expected system parameters are listed in Table 9. 
5.4.3.1 Probability of Collapse 
Suppose that the system load level would be expected at 5000 MW, and be expected distributed to each 
load bus according to the pro rata factors. We wish to compute its probability of voltage collapse. 
With 5% standard deviation, the true load is expected to fluctuate within an interval of 5,000 ±1.96 x 250 
MW with a probability of 95%. This randomness of system load is listed in Table 10. 
^ We emphasize that this is only an expectation because the future system will almost always deviate from this 
forecasted system. 
Any other system parameter could be used if desired. 
^ 1.% is m die 95'*' percentfle of a standard Normal distribution, and 250 MW is the standard deviation of load 
that is obtained by 5,000x5% MW according to our assumption. 
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Table 10: Randomness of System Load 
Expected Load Level Standard Deviation 
50.00 X 100 MW 250 MW 
Furthermore, the system load is expected to distribute among load buses widi random load sharing factors, 
the S% standard deviations of load distributing factors cause the P-V curve or the maximum loadability to be 
uncertain. In the example, we assume the fluctuation of real load sharing &ctors is independent with each other, 
and the reactive load has perfect correlation with the corresponding real load fluctuation, i.e., the power factor 
remains constant The resultant randomness of the loadability under different contingencies is calculated in 
Table 11. The randomness of loading maigin, which is the distance between the random maximum loadability 
and the random load level for each contingency, are then given in the middle columns in Table 12. 
Based on the Normal distribution of load margin, we can obtain the probability of collapse under each 
contingency. It is indeed the probability that the random load margin will be less than zero. The results are 
listed in the last column of Table 12. For instance, the probability of collapse over the next hour, for the load 
being 5,000 MW, is therefore only 2.16xI0~^. It is calculated by summing up all the products of collapse 
probability under contingency and the probability of the corresponding contingency, i.e., 
2.16x10"* =0.9999^1.2xI0"'° +4.58x10"' •134x10"^ +4.58x10"' •4.58x10"^ +4.58x10"' •1.61x10"* 
Figure 34 provides plots of collapse probabilities against different expected system loading levels under 
each contingency (including "no outages" case). We also show the total probability of collapse that is the siun of 
the collapse probabilities weighted by the contingency probabilities. 
Table II: Randomness of Loadability due to Uncertain Load Sharing Factors 
Occurrence Expected Standard 
Contingency Probability Loadability Deviation 
(xlOO MW) 
No Outage 0.999 66.86 1.114 
Outage 130-120 4J8e-5 58.05 0.980 
Outage 230-130 4.58e-5 54.51 0.982 
Outage 230-120 4.58e-5 65.11 1.115 
Table 12: Randomness of Load Margin 
Expected Standard Probability 
Contingency Margin Deviation of Collapse 
(xlOOMW) Under Contingency 
No Outage 16.86 2.737 lJ2e-10 
Outage 130-120 8.05 2.685 1.34e-3 
Outage 230-130 4.51 2.686 4.58e-2 
Outage 230-120 15.11 2.737 1.61e^ 
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Figure 34: Probability of Voltage Collapse 
In some cases, one may only consider the uncertainty of contingencies with deterministically known load 
levels and other parameters. The probability of collapse, shown in Figure 35 for our example, is then only 
determined by the cumulative probability of contingencies. It has a similar shape with the total probability of 
collapse in Figure 34, except for the abrupt steps due to discrete probability of contingencies. 
30 *0 so 
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Figure 35: Probability of Voltage Collapse with only Uncertain Contingencies 
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5.4.3.2 Expected Impact of Collapse 
For the impact of collapse, we assume the outcome will be an entire system blackout,^  as mentioned m 
Section S32.S, where both all the loads and generation units are lost For the considered area, when the system 
load level is at 5,000 VfW or 465 MW in the local area, the expected impact (m load would be S139,500, where 
the rate of cost consequence is unifonnly assumed as $50 per MWhour for a flat expected duration of 6 hours. 
In terms of the cost associated with the generation units, a fixed startup and repair cost is estimated at $156,000 
per generation unit There are three units in the plant of area considered. The expected impact associated writh 
generators is $468,000. The total expected impact of collapse in the local area considered would be around $0.6 
million when system load would reach 5,000 MW (see Figure 36). 
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Figure 36: Expected Impact of Collapse 
5.4.3.3 Expected Impact of No-Collapse 
Under the condition that the voltage does not collapse, there are several possible insecure outcomes when 
the system is exposed to uncertainties such as contingencies, load, etc. The outcomes include the thermal 
overload of transmission lines, overload in transfonners, voltage-out-of-limit on loads, and transient instability 
on generation units. Each insecurity problem has its own uncertainty dependency and impact characteristics. 
The expected composite impact of no-collapse is the sum of all of them. 
It is hard to know just what would happen if we exceeded to system loadability. All we know for sure is that 
it is a very undesirable outcome, perhaps entirely unacceptable under any circumstances. We simply assign such 
outcomes a "large" consequence, so that we are assured of large risk if the outcome becomes likely. 
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5.4.3.3.1 Expected Impact on Lines due to Thermal Overload 
We obtained the risk-flow curves for each transmission line in the desired area. To determine the risk on 
line according to the system operating condition, a power flow is needed to solve for how much MVA flow is 
transferrmg on the line. As described m Section S.4.I, we use the expected system load level as the 
representative of sj^em operating condition, and successively increase it to see how the risk evolves along 
various operating conditions. This procedure can be more easily performed by a Continuation Power Flow.^ 
According to this scenario, the line flows fiom bus #130 to bus #120 are shown in Figure 37 against system 
load levels. The flows on the other two lines in this area are in Figure 38 and Figure 39. It can be seen, in most 
cases, that the line 130-120, which exports most enerigy from the local area to the southern area, is heavily 
loaded, compared to the other two lines. 
As addressed in the component line overload risk study, aU of the three lines have a deterministic 
continuous rating around 400 MVA. Their component risk-flow curves are shown in Figure 31. By the system 
line overload risk assessment, where the system-side uncertainties are considered, the expected overload impact 
on the considered lines are calculated and shown in Figure 40, where the total overload impact in the area is 
represented by the high-lighted curve. 
In Figure 40, the total thermal risk on transmission lines is almost dominated by the risk of line 130-120, 
which makes the 130-120 risk curve is not very visible. This is consistent with the fact that line 130-120 
transfers most of the energy firom the northern to the southern part of the system. 
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Figure 37: Flows on Line 130-120 versus Area Load Levels 
^ One may also perform this overload risk stucty by solving for ordmary power flows in a successive way. The 
Contmuation Power Flow, however, shows the turning point and is more helpful for the vohage risk assessment 
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Figure 38: Flows on Line 230-120 versus Area Load Levels 
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Figure 39: Flows on Line 230-130 versus Area Load Levels 
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Figure 40: Expected Impact on Lines 
5.4.3.3.2 Expected Impact on Transformers due to Thermal Overload 
The flows on transformers are obtained in the same manner as used for line flows. Under the occurrence of 
contingencies, the flows on transformer 120-90 and 120-100 versus area load levels are shown in Figure 41 and 
Figure 42, respectively. 
The component risk study on these transformers is given in Figure 32 by the transformer's risk-flow curve. 
All of the three lines have a deterministic rating at 400 MVA. By the system overload risk assessment, where 
the system-side uncertainties are considered, the expected overload impact on the considered transformers are 
calculated and shown in Figure 43, where the total overload impact in the area is represented by the high-lighted 
curve. 
5.4.3.3.3 Expected Impact on Load due to Voltage-Out-of-Limit 
There is an aggregated load bus, bus #130, in the area considered. The voltage levels at this bus according 
to various operating conditions under contingencies are obtained from the Continuation Power Flows in the 
same manner, and at the same time, as the branch flows are obtained (See Figure 44). 
The risk-voltage curve at this bus, obtained from the component risk study on bus loads, is depicted in 
Figure 33. Using the system overload risk assessment, where the system-side uncertainties are considered, the 
expected overload impact on the considered load is calculated by combining both Figure 44 and Figure 33, as 
shoum in Figure 45. The total voltage impact in the area is represented by the high-lighted curve in Figure 45. 
The risk of voltage-out-of-limit is not significant in this case because the local area is a net export area where 
the vohage does not dip too much around generation area (see Figure 44). 
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Figure 44: Voltage at bus #130 versus Area Load Levels 
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Figure 45: Expected Impact on Load 
5.4.3.3.4 Expected Impact on Generation Units due to Transient Instability 
One generation plant with three units is in the local area we considered. The possibility of fault, such as 
one-phase, two-phase, three-phase and two-phase-to-ground &ult occurs at various locations in the area, may 
cause the units at bus #13 to lose thefar synchronism, and result in tripping units. The expected impact on units 
due to possibility of transient instability is shown in Figure 46. 
SyMm UMd imi. oetOO MW) 
Figure 46: Expected Impact on Generation Units 
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5.4.3.4 Composite Risk 
The composite risk is the sum of 
1) risk of collapse, the probability of collapse times expected impact of collapse, 
2) risk of overload on lines, the probability of no-coUapse times expected impact on lines, 
3) risk of overload on transformers, the probability of no-collapse times expected impact on transformers, 
4) risk of interruption on loads, the probabflity of no-collapse times expected impact on loads, and 
5) risk of transient instability, the probability of no-collapse times the expected impact on units. 
The composite risk, together with all of the above individual risks associated with each power system 
insecurity problems, is shown m Figure 47. '^ It provides quantitative measurements about how much money is 
going to be lost due to possible power system insecurity, given various operating conditions. For example, when 
the system is operating at the level of 3,000 MW that is almost close to the total system capability, there is a 
composite risk level of $13.75 associated with this operating condition. Among the overall S13.7S of risk, 
$12.69 is because of possible transient instability, around Sl.OS is due to transformer overload, only S0.004 is 
associated with transmission line overload, and almost zero (less than Six I0~^) risk is due to voltage collapse 
and out-of-limit at this circumstance. This is consistent with the &ct we purposely modified the original 
unstressed system to be transient stability stressed system. 
The resultant composite risk has many advantages in its use as a new security mdex. The risk in Figure 47 
gives a quantitative measurement of insecurity for the operating positions. This measurement is based on the 
fimdamental &ctors that determine the security level, specifically event likelihood, consequence, and their 
related uncertainties. Computation of this risk measurement does not require a preliminary specification of a 
specific boundary. As a result, it eliminates the need for the traditional presuppositions necessary for a 
deterministic environment where hard boundaries are determined by worst-case "credible" events. It can 
measure risk both within the traditional security boundary and outside the boundary. It is useful as a decision­
making aid in determining operating limits associated with security problems. For example, one might compare 
the risk of the deterministic security limit, given in Figure 47, which is approximately $102 over the next hour, 
with the benefit associated with the loading position, to decide whether it is worthwhile to operate at that level. 
Security has a price. Instead of limiting the operating condition with a significant security margin inside a 
deterministic boundary, the risk suggests a price of insecurity. The risk implies an expectation of future cost due 
to possible insecurity problems. It adds an additional implicit cost to the cost of energy delivered. Figure 48 
plots a marginal risk in the local area with respect to various system's loading positions. For example, it 
Figure 47 is a semi-log plot on risk measurements. The transient instability risk stops at its left end because of 
the property of logorithm where the risk is zero. Another thing we need to be aware of is that the small and flat 
risk close to the bottom of the semi-log plot, represents a very small amount of risk where the truncate error of 
software makes this risk show up on the plot. 
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suggests an expected $0,024 per MWhour of addMonal implicit cost charged for the possibility of losing 
security when the system is running at the level of 3,000 MW. The idea of "Bus Incremental Risk"" can be 
mtroduced to {nice the cost of security at each bus. 
The risk, or tfx expectation of monetaay impacty discussed in this dissertation, however, only provides an 
expectation of fiiture insecurity costs. It does not guarantee that the future outcome will be exactly the same as 
this statistical expectation. More mformation, such as variance of this risk, may be included together with risk to 
make better operating decisions. 
5.5 Summary 
A probabilistic method to compute the operating composite risk is presented in this chapter. The resulting 
risk represents the expected future cost of hybrid power system security problems; transmission line overload, 
transformer overload, voltage collapse, vohage-out-of-limit, and transient instability, based on the information 
from the current operating condition. The risk gives a quantitative measure of security both within and outside 
the traditional security boundary. It is promising in many areas such as power system decision-making for 
operation, security monitoring, and pricing. 
" This comes from the pricing method of "Bus Incremental Cost (BIQ". 
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6 DECISION-MAKING UNDER RISK 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1.1 Problem Statement 
The electric power industry is shifting &om a regulated vertically integrated business environment with a 
captive market to a de-regulated competitive market environment. This change will result in a profound impact 
on power system operation. It will also require operating criteria to include uncertainty in arriving at operating 
limits. We have seen the uncertainty of market demand and supply, and hence, the price uncertainties in the 
system operation. The methods of risk management that have been used emphasize market trading that focuses 
on the economic aspects. However, the traditional deterministic reliability criteria are still intact, even though 
the essence of reliability is also a decision-making problem under uncertain .^ 
To maintain system reliability under these uncertainties, certain Innits are required regardless of the 
economic forces behind the markets. The current practice in the electric power industry is to use deterministic 
methods to calculate these limits and keep the system reliable. 
The blame has been expressed by some engineers that the marketer, who is driven by monetary profits to 
use economic risk management, is pushing the engineer to continually reduce the current safety margin and to 
operate systems closer and closer to the deterministic security limits. Today's universal deterministic approach 
to security assessment, however, presents remarkable gaps between the industry trend and the results it 
provides. 
The contradiction between economics and reliability has motivated us to propose an alternative risk-based 
security assessment to chart the system operation and connect power system economics and reliability together. 
With the quantified risk, we are able to control or manage the system with more informed decisions. 
6.1.2 Previous Work 
There are many decision strategies used by modem financial management They are generally classified 
into deterministic and probabilistic criteria. We will describe them in Section 62. 
The dominant strategy used in power system operations is the deterministic criterion as iterated in the 
previous chapters. It belongs to the general strategy of Maximin benefit or Minimax cost criteria. The best 
example of this strategy is the well-known topic of security constrained optimal power flow [85], where the 
benefit is maximized under the constraints that all the N-1 deterministic security limits are satisfied. This 
strategy aims to maximize the minimum benefit induced by the possible maximum cost of insecurity. 
Other strategies can be found in [87] and [88] where the "Minimax Regret" criterion is proposed for power 
system reliability management 
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6.1.3 Our Approach 
We will introduce several basic strategies mainfy used in financial man^ement into power system 
opaadons. For different decision-makers under various situations, different strategies may be used. However, 
the ultimate goal is to make more informed decisions. Although all the strategies, both deterministic and 
probabilistic criteria, are useful, we believe the probabilistic decision-making strategies based on quantitative 
risk assessment provide a distinct advantage over deterministic methods in that they provide a framework for 
using available informati<m and measure the uncertainQr of the available information. These advantages result in 
more informed decisions. 
In Section 6.2, we describe a number of general decision-making strategies. From this description, one may 
observe how a deterministic strategy relates to other strategies that make use of probabUistic characterization of 
information. This descripticHi offers a framework under which risk-based security assessment may be used in 
practice, which is the primary goal of this chapter. In addition. Section 63 outlines how one of these strategies, 
the decision-making method using expected monetary values, may be employed using risk-based seciuity 
assessment and Section 6.4 provides some illustrations. 
6.2 General Decision Strategies 
6.2.1 Decision-Making with No Prior Distribution (Deterministic Criteria) 
The first type of decision-making is characterized by completely ignoring any probabilistic characteristic of 
the problem. Among them, the maximin or minimax criterion is the most common criteria. 
6.2.1.1 Maximin or Minimax Criterion 
The Maximin Criterion suggests to "examine the minimum gain associated with each action and then take 
the action that maximizes the minimum gain. This is a pessimistic criterion that directs attention to the worst 
outcome and then makes the worst outcome as desirable as possible." It is also called the Minimax Criterion, "if 
the outcomes of the action are stated in terms of loss or disutility then one minimizes the maximum loss"[86]. 
A simple example as in Table 13 where SI and S2 are two possible states of nature, AI through A3 are 
three actions, the numbers listed in the table represent the gain of each action for the outcome when a state of 
nature occurs. By this example, we decide to take the action A2 because it has the largest minimum gain (least 
maximum loss) compared to other actions. 
Table 13: Maximin Criterion 
AI A2 A3 
SI 0 8 20 
S2 30 18 0 
Mhumumgain 0 8 0 
Maximin wBfmBKSmBBarn 
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6.2.1.2 Minimax Regret Criterion 
A second strategy, Minimax Regret" suggests the application of the minimax criterion, which seeks to 
avoid "hurt", to a "regret" table. The regret table is created by the foUovdng rules. "If the decision maker takes 
an action and the state of nature occurs for which the gain is largest for this action, then he/she will have no 
regret. However, if he/she takes an action for which the gain is not the largest, and that same state of nature 
occurs, then he/she will have a regret of the difference between the largest gain and that which he/she 
receives"[86]. This strategy is iUustrated in Table 14 and Table IS, where the largest gain is obtained from 
Table 14, and the regret table is computed in Table IS. 
Table 14: Maximum Gains 
Al A2 A3 
SI 0 8 20 
S2 30 18 0 
Table 15: Regret Table and Minimax Regret Criterion 
Al A2 A3 
SI 20-0=20 20-8=12 20-20=0 
S2 30-30=0 30-18=12 30-0=30 
maximum regret 20 12 30 
mmimax 
6.2.1.3 Hurwicz a Index Criterion 
Hurwicz suggests an application to "examine some weighted combination of the maximum and minimum 
gain and then take the action which has the most desirable weighted value. The weights a and 1-a are numbers 
between zero and one" [86]. An example with a=% is illustrated in Table 16. 
Table 16: Hurwicz a Index Criterion 
Al A2 A3 
SI 0 8 20 
S2 30 18 0 
a index %*0i^ *30=75 X»8+K»18=103 *»0+%«20=S.0 
maximum 
" This concept was also discussed in [87] and [88] for applying to power system planning. 
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However, no one has suggested empirically obtaining die a with decision makers; "but if someone feels 
that the Hurwicz index characterizes his criterion, the burden of proof is upon him" [86]. 
6.2.1.4 Laplace Criterion 
This criterion is based on the assumption diat ail possible states are equally likely, that is, it calculates the 
flat average gain for each action and takes the acdon widi the largest average gam. An example is shown in 
Table 17. 
Table 17: Laplace Criterion 
A1 A2 A3 
SI 0 8 20 
S2 30 18 0 
Average gain (0+30y2=15 (8+l8)/2=l3 (20+0)/2=10 
maximum 
6.2.1.5 Selecting a Criterion 
Each of the above criteria ignores the probabilistic nature of states. However, there is an implicitly fixed 
prior distribution^. So a criterion and its resulting action are optimal only if they are the best against this prior 
distribution. This implies that "our first step in solving the decision-making problem is to search a suitable prior 
distribution which depends upon the information that we possess conceming the states of nature" [86]. This 
results in a further class of decision-making criterion, i.e., decision-making with prior distribution. 
6.2.2 Decision-Making with Prior Distribution 
One might argue that the decision-making ignoring the probability of the states of nature is not suitable. An 
alternative is the decision making with a prior probability distribution which is "characterized by the decision 
maker having either partial or complete knowledge of the probability distribution on the state of nature"[86]. 
This type of decision-making under uncertainty can be viewed as including a probability distribution to obtain 
the maximum expected value of gain. 
6.2.2.1 Probability Functions 
E*robability frmctions are vital in every decision problem under uncertainty. There are three ways to 
determine the prior probability functions. They are logical, empirical, and subjective [86]. 
• The logical approach determines the probability of an event by considering the logical possibilities. Take 
an event that an ideal coin when flipped will turn up heads as the example; its probability is 
^ It wUl be explained in Section 6223. 
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^ti^Heads)-Ml since there are only two outcomes and the result will either be, heads or tails, and the 
coin isideaL 
• The empirical approach to developing a probability function consists of considering the frequency ratio 
from a large number of trials, i.e., number of observations divided by the number of trials. However, only 
after repeated observations can we speak of the empirical probability functions. 
• The subjective approach is to assign subjective values to the probability of events. It takes account of a 
certain kind of numerical measure of s(Mnebody's opinion. 
"The difference between logical, empirical, and subjective probabilities comes down to a mere difference 
of interpretation as to the source of the probability statement''[86]. It is believed that this distinction is an 
important philosophical point But when it comes to solving decision makers' problems, it is believed the 
recognition of the use of the calculus of probability is more important than the origin of the probability 
statement, because any prior probability can be revised in the face of new evidence and experience. 
6.2.2.2 Maximizing Expected Value 
It can be argued that choosing the action or strate^ with maximum expected utility value is a reasonable 
criterion of choice. Given the utility fimction, "a decision maker's preferences among risky prospects''[86], we 
can solve the decision problem by maximizing expected utUity. We assume utiliX) as a utility function. It can 
be expressed by the sum of functions in powers of (X-C), using Taylor's Series expansion, where the constant 
C is the expected value EiX), which is the expected value of gain given an action A. We obtain 
Equation 38 : Taylor's Expansion of Utility Function 
mikxIA ) = tail(Em)* (jr -
Taking the expectation of the above equation, since E{x - EiX))=0, we obtain the expected utility of the 
action A, which is 
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Equation 39: OecompositioD of Expected Utility under Action 
euiA) = E{tailiX\A)) 
where o-^ = e(X - E(X)Y is the variance of the distribution of X, gi= E{X - EiX^f is the skewness of the 
distribution, and = E{X -E{Xif is the kurtosis. 
Equation 39 gives the expected value of utility in terms of the moments of the distribution and the 
derivatives of the utility fimction. For example, if the outcomes of an action are distributed normally, only the 
first two terms are significant, since the Normal distribution has only two moments, i.e., mean and variance. 
This assumption leads to a Mean-Variance analysis [89] of the decision choices. 
While maximizing expected utility is the general choice criterion, it was however, argued in [86] and [90] 
that maximizing expected monetary value is equivalent to maximizing expected utility with continuous repeated 
decisions in the long run. 
To illustrate this point, the example from Section 6.2.1 is used, and a probability distribution is attached to 
each possible state of nature under each action. The result is shown in Table 18. The gain for each action under 
various uncertainties is given as a monetary gain. 
Table 18: Maximizing Expected Value 
Pr(S,|/<,) Pr(5,M,) ^2 Pr(S,M,) •^3 
0.5 0 0.8 8 0.8 20 
52 0.5 30 02 18 0.2 0 
expected gam 
maximum 
15 10 16 
16 
6.2.2.3 Relationship between Decision-Making with Prior and without Prior 
Probabilities 
Each of the deterministic criteria in Section 6.2.1 is equivalent to the decision-making with a subjective 
prior distribution [86]. For example, the maximin criterion expresses the belief that the probability of the 
possible states depends on which action is chosen, that is, for any action the worst possible state will occur with 
probabUity one. This claim is illustrated in Table 19. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn for the Minimax Regret, Hurwicz a, and Laplace Criteria. A decision 
maker using deterministic decision strategy is actually subjectively betting the occurrence of a particular 
situation. 
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Table 19: Maximiii Criterion vs. Mazimam Expected Valne 
o Ml) Pr(5,M,) A2 
1 0 I 8 0 20 
0 30 0 18 1 0 
minifnuin gqin 0 8 0 
maxmun mm 
expected gain 0 8 0 
maximum mm 
6.2.3 Decision-Making with Posterior Distribution 
"This type of decision making problem is characterized by the possibility of obtaining additional 
information or data before a decision is rendered''[86]. The decision is then made between the available actions 
by finding the maximum expected value for each action, with the posterior probabilities which are the revised 
prior probabilities. 
6.2.3.1 Obtaining Posterior Probability 
The information we get is not perfect or is not possible to perfect in regard to predicting which state of 
nature will occur and what the probability fimction is. The prior distribution used in computing expected value 
may not be perfect even though we try to make it perfect according to the information and experience we 
possess. 
With the historical experience of states of nature, we have a collection of data, for instance, the wind speeds 
Z, 's under various weather conditions. According to these data, we can have a conditional probability of 
obtaining an information when a state occurs, i.e., Pr(Z^ 15^). In this case, we can get the probability of wind 
speeds when a thunderstorm occurs and when there is no thunderstorm by the empirical approach described in 
Section 6.2.2.1. An example is listed in Table 20. 
Table 20: Conditional Probability of Wind Speed under Various Weather Conditions 
Low Medium High 
^2 
0.7 02. 0.1 
5^2 0.5 03 0.2 
We assume the uncertain states of nature, e.g., thunderstorm, have a prior distribution P t (S , ) ,  say 
Pr(5|) = 0.7, Pr(52 ) = 03. It indicates the probability that a thunderstorm will occiu' is 0.7. These probabilities 
could be obtained by an empirical approach based on previous experience, or even by subjective judgement 
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Our objective is to obtain a refumi probability function for the uncertain states of nature given additional 
observed information. To compute the posterior distribution with additional observed information, Bayes' 
foimula [14] is used to revise the priw probability distribution. 
Equation 40: Bayes' Formula in Computing Posterior Proimbility 
PKS,)xPr(Z,|5,) 
Pr(S,)xPr(Z, |5,)+Pr(S2)xPr(ZJS2)+... 
Thus, if a medium wind speed (Z2) happens to be read at a tone, the new distribution or posterior 
probabUity distribution would be: 
Equation 41: Example of Posterior Probability 
Pr(S, IZ2) = ^  ^  o  0.7*0J2 + 03»0J 
Pr(S2|Z2) = OJ^OJ ^ 
^ 2 1  2 '  0 . 7 » 0 . 2 + 0 3 * 0 3  
Note that the observed data Z2 (observed a medium wind) modifies the prior probabilities, Pr(5|) from 0.7 
to 0.609, and Pr(52 ) from 0.3 to 0391. In this case, we update our prediction of thunderstorm with probability 
0.7 to a lower probability 0.6, when we observe the wind speed is not high. This procedure can be continuously 
repeated to refine the prior distribution, as long as more data is observed. In this manner we continue to build on 
our experience and make better decisions under exposure to the uncertain world. 
6.2.3.2 Decision-Making under Posterior Distribution 
To maximize the expected value is the decision strategy under the posterior distributions. In this process, 
the prior probability in Section 6.22.2 is continually refined by observing additional information. 
6.3 Power System Decision-Making under Risic 
There are several ways to deal with the power system seciuity under risk. We have seen a fruitful history 
and experience in applying deteraiinistic approaches to avoid risk. We would not discuss the deterministic 
decision-making strategy used in power systems. Rather, we propose several probabilistic decision-making 
schemes based on the risk assessment developed in the previous chapters. 
In accordance with the definition of the degree of risk provided earlier, the strategy here is based on 
expected monetary value under either prior or posterior probability functions. Generally, as explained in 
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Section 6J22J1, maximization of expected monetary value may not be sufficient in managing risk under 
dififeient personal utility fimctions. More variables, such as variance and even skewness, may be added to the 
decision-making schemes. Based on Equation 39, one should not have difficulty in adding more terms and 
constructing mote strategies^ using the generalized expccted utility value. 
6.3.1 Operation with Risk Restrictions 
A brute force approach using the quantitative risk assessment is to determine operating limits by a [He-
defmed acceptable risk level. In other words, we limit our operating conditions such that the risk, the expected 
value of possible cost consequence, is bounded within a limit For ocample, it can be used to determine a 
thermal rating based on component risk analysis of a transmission line. For the system operation, there are 
several other ways to apply this criterion. 
6.3.1.1 Security Constrained Optimal Power Row 
The strategy is the same as the ordinary security constrained optimal power flow (OFF) [8S], i.e.. 
Equation 42 : Security Constrained Optimal Power Flow 
max RevenueCJT | y4)-Cost(Jf | A) 
SJ .  
Postcontingency Flow < FlowLimit 
Postcontingency Voltage e VoltageRange 
other pre-determined limits 
The key point here is that all the constraints to this optimization problem are pre-determined or 
deterministic as we see the existing security limits. However, those limits can be determined either 
deterministically or probabilistically. As we develop the two-tiered risk assessment in previous chapters, these 
limits can be determined by the "component" risk assessment applied to a pre-defined risk level. Each 
individual supplier, transmission owner or distribution company, may define their own acceptable risk level for 
determining the post-contingency flow and voltage limits. The manner in which this optimization problem is 
solved is identical to the conventional OFF. 
This scheme is suitable for each individual to determme their own decision criterion, greedy or 
conservative, according to their own utility fimctions and preference to the risk. Meanwhile, the methods in 
coordinating the system-wide security level are the same as those presently used in the industry. The system 
security can be maintained by the transaction curtailment through existing congestion management approaches. 
" One may seek to maximize the expected monetary value with minimum or pre-defined variance. 
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6.3.1.2 Risk Constrained Optimal Power Row 
Unlike the ordinaiy security constrained OPF, if each individual does not provide the operating limits 
according to their mdividual preference, die system security coordinator could have the opportunities to 
dispatch the system such that the "system" risk is within a pre-defined level. The operation strategy is then. 
Equation 43: Risk Constrained Optimal Power Flow 
max Revenue(X| A)-Cost(X 1 A) 
sJ. 
Risk(X I A) < RiskLimit 
where Risk{X \ A) is the risk of an operating condition given a control action A, that is the expected monetary 
cost consequence associated with the operating condition. 
In this case, each individual transfers the decision-making problem to the system security coordinator not 
by defining their operating limits according to their individual risk level. Rather, they provide their component 
risk assessment to the central security coordinator such that the coordinator can maneuver the system on behalf 
of limiting the entire system within a risk-based security boundary. The transferred information consists of risk 
versus loading level for each component, as illustrated in previous chapters of this dissertation. 
This scheme is suitable for the system where all the individuals have the same preference to the risk such 
that the system security coordinator can apply a uniform scheme limiting the system risk, and identifying the 
risk allocated to each individual. However, the allocation of system risk to each individual may not be uniform. 
This may be used in the system curtailment when the system security is the predominant objective. 
6.3.2 Operation with Expected Monetary Value Maximization 
The more greedy strategy is to release all the security constraints and to maximize expected monetary value 
under either prior or posterior probability functions. 
Equation 44: Maximizing Expected Monetary Value 
max Profit(X 1 A) - Risk(X | A) 
where Profit(X | A) = Revenue-Cost is the (expected)^ profit of the operating condition by the action A. 
^ We generally believe the benefit is uncertain according to some exogenous variables, such as market prices. 
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The first order condMoa of this maximization problem is simply "marginal profit equals to margmal risk", 
which is similar to the common sense of economics, "marginal revenue equals to the margmal cost", when 
maximum profit is reached. 
Equation 45: First Order Condition of Decision-Making under Risic 
aProfit(X|A) ^ aRisk(X|A) 
SA ~ 5A 
To reach the expected optimum of an uncertain situation. Equation 45 suggests the selection of a position 
(or an action) where its marginal risk is equal to the marginal profit For example, a transmission owner may 
choose a limiting flow where the marginal risk of overload with respect to an additional flow is the same as the 
expected marginal profit of the additional flow. 
To solve for this optimization problem, both mathematical and market-based approaches could be used. For 
the market-based solution, the security coordinator calculates the marginal risks against additional market 
actions, for example, marginal risk against an additional transaction amount These marginal risks can be used 
as a pricing signal to adjust rather than restrict the behavior of market players such that the free market will 
reach its optimal equilibrium by the participation of individuals. Since the real commodity trading price 
includes a security price obtained from an expectation, the extra revenue collected through the security price is 
transferred to the risk takers, or used as an insurance to cover the possible cost in case the real impact of 
insecurity would occur. 
6.4 Illustrations 
It is reasonable that each decision maker may apply different decision criteria to make his/her individual-
dependent decisions. Even though in a case where the criteria used are the same, the tolerance level of risk may 
still be different In this section, three examples using risk assessment are given to illustrate the possible 
application of risk in power system decision-making problems. The applications by no means are exhaustive, 
instead they are more focused to "fit" the risk into the present deterministic tradition in order to act as a possible 
transition to the future. 
An application of component risk assessment is given for a transmission line to determine its line ratings. 
These ratings can be directly used to determine the existing deterministic security analysis. The same approach 
can be applied by the distribution company to determine its voltage limits for each load bus by the component 
voltage risk assessment approach. An application of composite "system" risk assessment is given for a security 
coordinator to determine maximum transaction amount or its curtaihnent in case the composite risk level would 
be violated. A third example is to use marginal risk to price the system congestion under the competitive 
environment 
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6.4.1 Determining Ratings Based on Risk Analysis 
Three ratings commonly used for ACSR overhead conductors are normal, long-time emergency and short-
time emergency ratmgs [28]. In this section, we describe how these ratings are determined under the risk-based 
approach. 
6.4.1.1 Normal (Continuous) Rating 
Thermal rating of a transmission line specifies a maximum amount of current diat ensures the risk will 
remain within a prescribed level. Based on the risk calculation for continuous line loading, normal rating is the 
continuous current that has the risk level, one is willing to accept. 
We assume the chosen deterministic normal rating to be acceptably safe. This guideline is used in this 
dissertation to give a reference risk level to determine the thermal ratings. One may choose a higher level of risk 
if the expected benefit is recognized to significantly exceed the additional risk. 
As the example in Section 3.4 shows, the continuous rating, obtained directly from the component thermal 
risk study in Figure 11, depends on the prescribed risk level. If one would accept a risk of 0.01 (which means 1 
percent of the cost to re-conductor this circuit, or equivalently, I percent of the life loss compared with the 
designed one), then the continuous limiting current would be 1028/4. This risk is about 2 times as high as that 
incurred when the deterministic limit of 992^ is used. 
6.4.1.2 Long-Time Emergency Rating 
We determine the long-time emergency (LTE) rating as the current level that will incur the same risk under 
the shorter duration as the normal rating under continuous operation. We call this the Equal Risk Criterion [37]. 
The LTE rating is higher than the normal rating, not because of a higher maximum allowable temperature, as in 
the usual way to determine the line ratings ([29], [39]), but because the limited overload time used in the LTE 
rating calculation, relative to the continuous overload time used in the normal rating calculation, results in a 
much reduced overload impact This fact allows that the LTE rating will be computed for any duration less than 
the remaining conductor life (days, weeks, months), and the resulting rating will be higher than the normal 
rating, while the incurred risk will be the same as that of the normal rating. 
Since the risk of deterministic continuous rating is implicitly accepted, the same amount of the risk 
associated with the temporary overload should also be acceptable. This is the so called the "equal risk criterion" 
which is used to decide the long-time and short-time ratings. Based on this criterion, one may guarantee that the 
temporary ratings are as safe as the deterministic continuous loading in the sense of expected monetary cost 
The long-time ratings can be determined by the iso-risk contours as shown m Figure 49. The contour 
represents a locus of combination of loading level and its duration where the risk level is the same. The LTE 
rating is 1225^ for the same risk level as the continuous one. The LTE ratings are useful during system 
recovery or for short-time energy exchange. 
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Figure 49: Determining Long-Time Emergency Rating under Risk 
6.4.1.3 Short-Time Emergency Rating 
We also use the equal risk criterion in determining the Short-Time Emergency (STE) rating. Here, the STE 
rating is also higher than the normal rating because of the much-reduced impact of overload. Furthermore, it is 
higher than the LTE rating because the dynamics of conductor temperature are effective in this time frame and, 
for the same current level, the one-hour temperature level is always lower than the steady state level that is used 
for LTE and normal ratings. STE rating (within 60 minutes), also based on the equal risk criterion, ranges 
between 1225A and over, as indicated in Figure SO. This would be useful during emergency periods and short-
time security assessment. From Figure SO, the deterministic IS-minute STE rating goes beyond the risk-based 
rating. That means operating on this deterministic STE rating for IS minutes does not ensure the same safety as 
the normal loading. It will result in a higher expected cost. 
6.4.2 The Risk Restriction Used in System Operation 
Another application of risk may be for the transaction or load curtailment under a congestion management 
One practice of current congestion management is to cut the proposed load when the deterministic security 
criteria are violated. As an example, we take a simple one-dimensional illustration of the load curtailment to 
illustrate use of the criteria rather than how to optimize the allocation of curtailment. A security coordinator 
could pre-define an acceptable composite risk level according to the requirement of a standard." We propose 
that this level of risk should be maintained throughout the system operation. 
" Such a standard has not been available so &r. 
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Figure SO: Determining Short-Time Emergency Rating under Risk 
As in the current congestion management, system transactions have to be curtailed in case the security is 
violated. The difference between risk-based congestion management and the current deterministic curtailment is 
that the system's operating boundary is determined by a limit on the composite risk rather than by limits on 
flows and voltages. As in the example in Section S.4, we first illustrate how the traditional security boundary for 
the system load level is determined by the deterministic criteria: 
• The pre-contingency flows in the desired area should be less than their normal ratings. The limit of 
system load is determined as 3600 MW according to Figure 37,33,34,36, and 37. 
• The post-contingency flows in the desired area should be less than their short-time emergency ratings. 
The limit is determined as 3800 MW for the system load level according to the same figures as above. 
• The bus voltages should be maintained within 5% of their normal level. The system load limit is 
determined as S600 MW according to Figure 44. 
• The system is voltage stable. The limit is determined as 5400 MW. 
• The system is transient stable. The load level limit is 2050 MW. 
Following the traditional decision-making practice, then, the deteraiinistic security boundary for the system 
load level is obtained as 2050 MW without any discount of safety margin. If 10% safety margin is required, the 
limit is then only 1845 MW. If the proposed schedule would exceed this level, the security coordinator has to 
curtail some amount of load such that the maxfanum of 1845 MW is maintained. However, the coordinator will 
not find it easy to justify the reduction of risk of insecurity caused by the curtailment of loads, since there is no 
quantification of risk. 
The risk assessment gives the security coordinator a chance to review the reduction of risk and further aid 
in deciding how much the load is worthwhile to curtaU. If, for example, die considered area would like to accept 
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average SI per hour risk of msecurity as its Ihnit of risk, then the system load could be lifted to 2200 MW 
accordmg to the composite risk plot m Figure 47. Depending on a standard or an agreement on the acceptable 
risk level that the system can tolerate, the operating limit can then be determined. 
6.4.3 Pridng Congestion by Marginal Risk 
A further extension of die idea of risk cap could be an application of marginal risk. In contrast to the 
traditional security limit, the area faces an increase of risk of $1.0-S0.2=$0.8 per hour for the 3SS MW increase 
of transactions in the example of Section 6.42. If this 19% (3S5/1846) increase of transaction does increase the 
profit of the area by S0.8 per hour, it may be of interest to this area in lifting the load by 19% since the 
additional profit is expected to cover the additional risk. We have proposed to use the marginal risk as the 
price of congestion m Section S.4J.4. The risk, calculated in this dissertation, represents the expected cost 
consequence because of possible insecurity of power system given the current operating condition. As we did in 
the example in Section 5.4 J.4, the marginal risk, which is the first derivative of the regional risk against the 
system load level, '^ represents the incremental monetary risk if an increment of load is demanded at the current 
load level. In other words, to trade one additional unit of electricity at the anient system condition, the local 
region is facing a risk to lose extra amount of money due to possible insecurity problems within this region. To 
cover this amount of "expected" loss, the local area needs to charge all the market players by the corresponding 
incremental risk. Because the marginal risk varies along the operating condition, this charge of congestion will 
be different under various system conditions depending on the potential of losing security. The plot in Figure 48 
indicates that this amount of charge increases when the system is more stressed by the demand. This pricing 
signal provides an incentive to market players that they will be charged more due to possible insecurity 
problems if they utilize facilities in a critical region or corridor. The revenue collected from the congestion price 
will either go to the risk takers, such as transmission lines, distribution loads, and generation units, depending 
on allocation of the composite risk, or it will fund an insurance to cover the "real" impact instead of "expected" 
impact in case a contingency occurs. 
6.5 Summary 
Both deterministic and probabilistic criteria used in the decision theory are introduced in this chapter. The 
quantitative probabilistic criteria provide informative strategies other than deterministic criteria. Instead of 
applying deterministic strategies in the power system operation, probabilistic criteria based on risk assessment 
may be used in various power system decision problems. 
A cross marginal risk, which is the first derivative of the local risk against the external load level, can be also 
calculated to represented the security nnpact of the external players to die local area. Furthermore, a marginal 
risk of a specific security problem, for instance, overload risk on a line, with respect to individual buses (a "bus 
incremental risk") can be treated as a "spot" congestion price on that line for each system injection. 
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7 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Contribution of This Woric 
An integrated method has been developed that allows risk-based securiQr assessment in an operating 
environment considering any type of security problem. The method explicitly calculates the risk of an operating 
point and permits more informed operating decisions. 
A two-tiered in&astructure has been developed to assess the risk of system operation: "component" and 
"system" risk assessment. Each approach encapsulates its own detailed statistical data and models within its 
analysis such that the entire risk assessment can be achieved modularly. The component assessment of risk of 
overioad provides a risk-flow curve for each individual line or other serial equipment, the system assessment, 
however, quantifies the system-wide overload risk by considering the system-wide disturbances. The 
component assessment of voltage risk provides a risk-vohage curve for each bus which enters the system 
voltage risk assessment 
Two most important and universal security problems: transmission line thermal overload and voltage 
insecurity, are quantified by their expected monetary cost consequences. Both are decomposed into 
"component" and "system" assessment. 
A method to compute risk of transmission line thermal overioad is developed to quantify the monetary 
impact of loss of life and loss of clearance incurred by transmission lines. 
A method to compute probability of voltage collapse by loading margins is developed. It is used to assess 
the risk of voltage collapse. In addition, the risk of voltage-out-of-limit without collapse is also quantified for 
any operating point Both characterize the risk incurred by end-users under possible voltage problems. 
A composite risk index for power system security is provided. The system operator can be informed by this 
composite risk including risks of transmission line overload, transformer overload, voltage collapse, voltage 
out-of-limit and transient instability. 
The risk assessment developed in this work leads more informed decision-making in operating power 
systems. Several decision schemes are given in this work by relating both component and system risk to various 
steps of system operations, from equipment rating determination to pricing in the marketplace. An example of 
applying component risk assessment is given by determining line ratings by "equal risk criterion" and an 
example of applying system risk is given by pricing power system security using "marginal risks". 
Finally, the risk charts both traditional and intact regions of power system operation. It acts as a bridge to 
enable system operators to balance system security with economics to meet the needs of Ae competitive 
marketplace. The index developed captures the notion of reliability and associates with it an economic cost in 
terms of dollars. 
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7.2 Suggestions for Future Work 
In this work, a method to perfonn risk-based security assessment in the operating environment is 
developed. To make this research accepted by industry, and eventually an mdustry standard, more work needs 
to be (tone. 
Work needs to be done in both probability and impact evaluation. We need a better estimation of 
probability fimctions for all the uncertainties. The posterior probability approach may be an effective way to 
refine die existing probability fimctions. Also, we need a more comprehensive and detailed estimation of impact 
of each insecurity problem. 
An industry standard for applying probabilistic approaches in power system operation is needed. 
Work from the risk assessment of this research can be extended as follows: 
• security constrained optimal power flow (OPF) 
As illustrated in Section 6 J. 1.1, one can use detailed risk-based component rating analysis to determine 
the limits for conventional optimal power flow method. 
• risk constrained OPF 
In contrast to security constrained OPF, the limitation of optimization problem becomes the system-wide 
composite risk. 
• congestion management 
The risk assessment is helpfiil for alleviating the network congestion and allocating the corresponding 
responsibilities. 
• risk-based security boundary 
Given a risk restriction, an operating boundary can be determined for guiding the system operation. 
• risk-based preventive and corrective control 
Under the risk-based environment, the preventive control becomes a way to mitigate the risk, while, the 
corrective control is to restore the system to an acceptable risk level. The control schemes may be 
optimized by obtaining the sensitivity of risk against desired control variables. 
• decision-making under risk. 
As indicated in Chapter 6, diere are many general strategies for decision-making. Under various situations 
and preferences, different criteria and the way to use them may be applied. For example, meanrvariance 
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analysis makes a tradeoff between expected value and variance;^ a confidence interval gives a range 
where the random true cost is located. 
• Risk-based market pricing 
Pricing the network securiQr is getting more and more attention fiom the market environment The 
marginal risk method may be used to provide both discriminative and non-discriminative price signals. 
• value of mformation 
The expected monetary vahie based on posterior probability provides an additional value to the one based 
on the prior probability. This additional value becomes the value of the additional information for 
obtaining the posterior probability fimctions. 
• other aspects of security problems 
They include such as oscillatory instability and effects of protection actions. 
^ The variance can be obtained by methods used for expected value except for different calculation formula as 
listed m [IS]. 
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